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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OPENING THE COURTROOM DOORS FOR MIGRANT WORKERS:
THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS
AMENDMENT TO THE MIGRANT AND SEASONAL
AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT

I. INTRODUCTION
“I am a real migrant worker. I earned that name. I been knocked down
with the bruise. I been kicked down with the bumps. I fell a lot. I rolled.
Yes, I stumbled. I got my little nose scarred up. I got knocked in the head.”1
This is the tale of the migrant farm worker. Migrant farm work is not easy by
any stretch of the imagination.2 Farm labor consists of hazardous activities and
“consistently ranks with mining and construction work as one of the most
dangerous occupations in the United Sates.”3 Migrant workers must traverse
this large nation in search of employment, and upon finding it, they are often
uncertain how long the work will last, thus unsure of their continued ability to
earn income.4
In America, the conditions of migrant farm work are rarely discussed, and,
therefore, few Americans are aware of “the key role [migrant workers] play in
our lives.”5 Yet the United States government was, and is, well aware of the
frequent mistreatment of migrant workers. This awareness led to federal
legislation guaranteeing migrant workers protection from the detrimental
activities affecting them.6 What good are such federal rights, however, if they

1. DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF MIGRANT
FARMWORKERS TODAY 2 (1998) (presenting a migrant worker’s recollections of his work
conditions).
2. See Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest
Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 577-78 (2001).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 578.
5. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872
(2000) [hereinafter AWPA].
[T]he purpose of [the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act is] to
remove the restraints on commerce caused by activities detrimental to migrant and
seasonal agricultural workers; to require farm labor contractors to register under this
[Act]; and to assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers,
agricultural associations, and agricultural employers.
Id. § 1801.
899
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cannot be asserted in courts of law?7 This is the major threat facing migrant
workers.
Imagine the following: A farm owner in state A, believing that he is in
need of out-of-state workers because of a labor shortage in state A, hires
employees from state B for temporary work on his farm in state A. Farm
workers from state B then travel to state A and toil at their tasks in the fields.
Suppose also that the farm owner in state A, disregarding federal legislation,
takes advantage of the migrant workers.8 Because it is highly unlikely that a
migrant worker will seek legal recourse before his source of valuable income
has been exhausted, the migrant worker will have to return to his home in state
B before pursing legal action. If he is aware that his rights were violated, he
will then file a lawsuit in a court within the jurisdiction of forum state B.
However, a major obstacle that the migrant worker will face is the very real
possibility that the courts in forum state B will be unwilling to assert personal
jurisdiction over the defendant farm owner because of a lack of minimum
contacts.9 Under this scenario, migrant workers’ rights are of little value. It
will be unlikely that they will be able to assert their rights in the courts of state
B, and it is further unlikely that such a low-paid occupational group will be
able to muster the resources to litigate a claim in the farm owner’s state A.10
This Comment focuses on the problems arising from this common scenario.
In April 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the most recent
appellate decision regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction and migrant
workers, Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farm, Inc.11 Ochoa involved a personal
jurisdiction issue in a migrant worker context quite similar to the scenario
detailed above. While the Ochoa decision allowed for the reasonable exercise
of in personam jurisdiction by the court in Arizona over a New York farm
owner, the Ochoa court relied on an agency theory between the labor
contractor and the farm owner,12 and, therefore, it would have been decided
differently had such agency relationship not existed. More importantly, Ochoa
7. See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (holding that “[t]he
right to sue and defend in the courts” is a right in a society that is “conservative of all other rights,
and lies at the foundation of orderly government”).
8. Often this may be done by providing substandard housing or by failing to pay the
migrant worker federal- or state-mandated minimum wages. The migrant worker feels as though
no recourse is possible because of his “lack of opportunity in alternative occupations,” thus
leaving the worker with a sense of being “trapped” in his place of employment. See FARM
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (C.E. Bishop ed., 1967).
9. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (concluding that personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is proper when the defendant has minimum contacts in
the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
10. See Holley, supra note 2, at 580.
11. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002).
12. Id. at 1189-92.
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is an example of the unpredictable nature that exists with respect to asserting
personal jurisdiction in the migrant worker cases. Lacking the foreseeability as
to whether minimum contacts will be found to exist between the distant farm
owner, the litigation, and the forum state will hamper the effectiveness of
migrant workers asserting their federal rights in court.
To prevent the problem of unpredictability in constitutionally asserting
personal jurisdiction over farm employers in the migrant worker context and to
allow migrant workers better access to the courts of the United States in order
to litigate their claims under federal law, this Comment will argue for an
amendment to the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act13
(“AWPA”) allowing for nationwide service of process when a claim under the
AWPA is brought in a federal district court. To protect the due process rights
of the defendant farm owner from being unreasonably burdened by being
forced to litigate in a distant forum, Congress should amend the AWPA to
allow for service of process on non-resident defendants when such jurisdiction
over the person would be reasonable, as similarly interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.14
Although a per se reasonable nationwide service of process statute would
eradicate any unpredictability in asserting personal jurisdiction—because
personal jurisdiction would simply always exist—any amendment to the
AWPA cannot trump a defendant’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights,15
which are, of course, of constitutional magnitude. Congress, however, should
put the burden of proving an unreasonable assertion of personal jurisdiction
upon the defendant, thereby presuming that personal jurisdiction will be
constitutional, per the nationwide service of process amendment. In this case,
the unpredictability in finding personal jurisdiction that has plagued the
migrant worker cases will be greatly diminished, thus providing migrants
greater access to the courts.
Part II of this Comment will analyze the AWPA, and introduce the
provisions that protect migrant workers as well as the remedies available when

13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2000).
14. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1. See also infra note 17.
15. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. It is
the Fifth Amendment’s—not the Fourteenth’s—Due Process Clause that is implicated when
Congress grants federal courts the power to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants in claims
concerning federally-created rights, because the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction on state
jurisdiction while the Fifth Amendment is a restriction on federal jurisdiction. See Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1985); Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255,
259 (3d Cir. 1982).
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defendants in the farm community, such as farm owners, violate those
provisions. Even though this Comment focuses on the procedural aspect of
asserting the AWPA in court—not the substance of the AWPA itself—the
AWPA is introduced because it is the primary federal statute that guarantees
the rights of migrant workers.16 Part III will analyze the United States
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine by providing a chronological
analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine. Additionally, the Court’s
reasonableness of jurisdiction factors will be discussed alongside the minimum
contacts analysis because the Court has stated that such an analysis is also of
constitutional magnitude.17 Next, Part IV narrows the focus of personal
jurisdiction to the context of migrant workers by analyzing the four cases in
this area that have made their way to the appellate level. These cases are
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc.,18 Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc.,19
Chery v. Bowman,20 and Aviles v. Kunkle.21 This Part demonstrates that a
nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA is necessary in order
to prevent migrant workers from being barred procedurally from bringing suits
against farm owners. The discussion in Part IV also points out the
16. Most cases adjudicating the substantive rights of migrant workers focus on the AWPA.
See, e.g., Medrano v. D’Arrigo Bros. Co. of Cal., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Herrera
v. Singh, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (E.D. Wash. 2000).
17. In addition to the minimum contacts analysis, the Supreme Court has held that courts
must, in considering the assertion of personal jurisdiction, examine:
“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,”
“the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and
the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.”
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980)). See also infra Part III.
It is clear that such an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause can
never be narrowed to a bright line rule including only minimum contacts because the Court has
held that the factors regarding the reasonableness of a constitutional assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant are, in fact, dependant upon the outcome of the
minimum contacts test. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (holding that the five factors of the
reasonable fair play and substantial justice test may “serve to establish the reasonableness of
jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required”).
This issue also highlights the underlying theme in this Comment that a personal jurisdiction
analysis can never be a rigidly applicable test, but, rather, it must be an evolving constitutional
standard that adapts to a changing society. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (finding that the
interpretation of the Constitution must be adaptable to the times in order for it to truly be a living
document—“[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
18. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985).
20. 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990).
21. 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992).
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unpredictable nature of the appellate courts’ analyses in determining the issue
of personal jurisdiction in migrant worker cases. Part V discusses the legal
justifications for allowing Congress to enact nationwide service of process
statutes.22 The Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of serving
process on a nationwide basis since its decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.23 If Congress amends the AWPA to allow for such a form of
service of process, it must do so constitutionally. Part VI will analyze migrant
workers’ socio-economic conditions and suggest the reasons why Congress
must amend the AWPA to include service of process on a nationwide basis.
This Part will place a special emphasis on migrant workers’ poverty and their
lack of education. Furthermore, it will analyze the problems migrant workers
face in finding legal counsel to assist them in their claims, giving additional
support for Congress to remedy the procedural problem that migrant workers
face. Finally, this Comment offers a brief conclusion regarding the need to
help migrant workers effectively apply federal laws to their benefit. If the
AWPA is to benefit migrant workers to its fullest extent, the workers must be
able to assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners via
nationwide service of process.
II. THE MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the American public
began to hear about the mistreatment that migrant agricultural laborers
encountered from farm labor contractors.24 Common abuses included
fraudulent transportation charges billed to the workers, underpaying workers
for their labor, supplying workers with horrifically substandard housing, and

22. It is true that nationwide service of process and personal jurisdiction are not equivalent
in the mathematical sense; however, “[s]ervice of process is the vehicle by which the court may
obtain jurisdiction.” Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d. 147, 155 (1st Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Auto. Body
Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400, 402 (1st Cir. 1965)). The distinction, however, is relevant when
federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated solely upon diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2000). A claim under the AWPA will involve federal question subject matter
jurisdiction, and, therefore, this Comment will equate service of process with personal
jurisdiction. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 942
(11th Cir. 1997) (“When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, it becomes
the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction” (citing Chase & Sanborn Corp. v. Granfinanciera,
835 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989))); Driver, 577 F.2d at 155 n.23 (recognizing that “[t]he distinction
[between service of process and personal jurisdiction] is most important . . . in diversity cases”);
see also Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the
nationwide service of process provision of a federal statute creates a valid assertion of personal
jurisdiction in federal court).
23. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24. See S. REP. NO. 88-202, at 1 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3690, 3690.
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misrepresenting to the workers the nature and availability of work.25 Congress
felt the need to help the struggling migrant workers by enacting the Farm
Labor Contractor Registration Act of 196326 (“FLC”). To understand why the
AWPA—which replaced the FLC—exists today, the FLC must be briefly
analyzed.
A.

The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act

Congress’s purpose in enacting the FLC27 was to remove the restraints on
interstate commerce caused by the “irresponsible [labor] contractors”28 in their
treatment of migrant workers.29 All farm labor contractors were required to
register with the Secretary of Labor before engaging in agricultural recruitment
work.30 In fact, if a farm owner intended to rely on a third party to recruit
labor, the farm owner must have first made certain that the third party was
Through this registration,
registered with the Labor Department.31
enforcement agencies would have documentation to track labor contractors if
mistreatment and abuse accusations from migrant workers were to arise.
In addition to mandating registration of labor contractors, Congress also
forced all farm labor contractors to disclose to migrant workers at the time of
recruitment: (1) the place of employment; (2) the crops involved; (3) any
transportation and housing that would be provided; (4) the wages offered; (5)
the charges the labor contractor would make in offering his services
(recruitment); (6) the length of the job; (7) the existence of any strikes at the
place of employment; and (8) the existence of arrangements made by labor
contractors with retail businesses in the area of employment from which the

25. See S. REP. NO. 88-202, at 2-3, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3690, 3692.
26. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1982).
The FLC is examined in W. Gary Vause, The Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 11
STETSON L. REV. 185 (1982).
27. Congress enacted the FLC under the Commerce Clause. 7 U.S.C. § 2041(a), repealed by
AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. “Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 3.
28. 7 U.S.C. § 2041(b), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. “The term ‘farm
labor contractor’ means any person, who, for a fee, either for himself or on behalf of another
person, recruits, solicits, hires, furnishes, or transports migrant workers (excluding members of
his immediate family) for agricultural employment.” Id. § 2042(b).
29. See id. § 2041(b). The FLC defined migrant workers to include: “individual[s] [that
have] primary employment . . . in agriculture . . . or [those that] perform[] agricultural labor . . .
on a seasonal or other temporary basis.” Id. § 2042(g). For a comparison of this definition of
migrant workers with the definition under the AWPA, see infra note 45.
30. See 7 U.S.C. § 2043(a), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872.
31. See id. § 2043(c).
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contractor would receive a commission from sales made by the businesses to
the migrant workers.32
Violations of the FLC by the labor contractors gave migrant workers the
right to civil damages.33 Unfortunately, the FLC was not very effective in
preventing migrant workers from facing abuses. Litigation in this area almost
always centered on the FLC’s labor contractor exemption from liability
schemes,34 and only very rarely considered the protections of the workers.35
32. See id. § 2045(b). These obligations of the farm labor contractor are similar to those
under the AWPA. See AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2000).
33. 7 U.S.C.§ 2048(b), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872.
34. Under the FLC, the following were not considered farm labor contractors and, therefore,
were not liable for violations:
(1) any nonprofit charitable organization, public or nonprofit private educational
institution, or similar organization;
(2) any farmer, processor, canner, ginner, packing shed operator, or nurseryman who
personally engages in any such activity for the purpose of supplying migrant workers
solely for his own operation;
(3) any full-time or regular employee of any entity referred to in (1) or (2) above who
engages in such activity solely for his employer on no more than an incidental basis;
(4) any person who engages in any such activity (A) solely within a twenty-five mile
intrastate radius of his permanent place of residence and (B) for not more than thirteen
weeks per year;
(5) any person who engages in any such activity for the purpose of obtaining migrant
workers of any foreign nation for employment in the United States if the employment is
subject to—
(A) an agreement between the United States and such foreign nation; or
(B) an arrangement with the government of any foreign nation under which written
contracts for the employment of such workers are provided for and the enforcement
thereof is provided for through the United States by an instrumentality of such foreign
nation;
(6) any full-time or regular employee of any person holding a certificate of
registration under [the FLC];
(7) any common carrier or any full-time regular employee thereof engaged solely in
the transportation of migrant workers;
(8) any custom combine, hay, harvesting, or sheep shearing operation,
(9) any custom poultry harvesting, breeding, debeaking, sexing, or health service
operation, provided the employees of the operation are not regularly required to be away
from their domicile other than during their normal working hours; or
(10) any person who would be required to register solely because the person is
engaged in any such activity solely for the purpose of supplying full-time students or
other persons whose principal occupation is not farmwork to detassel and rogue hybrid
seed corn or sorghum for seed and to engage in other incidental farmwork for a period not
to exceed four weeks in any calendar year: Provided, That such students or other persons
are not required by the circumstances of such activity to be away from their permanent
place of residence overnight: Provided further, That such students or other persons, if
under 18 years of age, are not engaged in providing transportation in vehicles caused to be
operated by the contractor.
7 U.S.C. § 2042(b) (1976 & Supp. II 1979), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872.
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Many statutory exemptions allowed “possible labor contractors” to escape any
sort of punishment under the FLC, and, therefore, they had free reign to
mistreat migrant workers and abuse their rights. As enforcement agencies
became more preoccupied with technical legal disputes than with seeing that
migrant workers were treated fairly, farm workers rightly envisioned little hope
in securing their federal rights under the FLC.36 Congress took note of the fact
that migrant workers’ conditions had not improved and responded again by
repealing the FLC and enacting the AWPA.37
B.

The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act

The AWPA overhauled the federal regulatory protection scheme for
migrant workers.38 The most important change was that worker protection
requirements were enforced regardless of whether the defendant was a labor
contractor or a farm employer.39 In fact, the AWPA was the first federal labor
statute designed exclusively to regulate the employee-employer relationship in
the agricultural industry.40 It is clear, therefore, that Congress’s purpose in
enacting the AWPA was to allow the migrant worker greater legal leverage
35. See, e.g., Donovan v. Heringer Ranches, Inc., 650 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1981); Marshall v.
Silver Creek Packing Co., 615 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1980); DeLeon v. Ramirez, 465 F. Supp. 698
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Usery v. Golden Gem Growers, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 857 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
Congress noted that case law regarding litigation of the FLC, concerning the labor contractor
obligations, involved “exclusion from coverage” provisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548.
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2-3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548-49
(noting that the FLC and its 1974 amendments were futile in preventing abuses of migrant
workers).
37. Congress heard testimony, during the legislative sessions regarding the enactment of the
AWPA, to the effect that the FLC was “largely ignored and not adequately enforced.” H.R. REP.
NO. 97-885, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4548. For the definitional difference
between a migrant and seasonal worker, see infra note 45.
38. For protections regarding the migrant worker, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1823 (2000). For
protections regarding seasonal workers, see id. §§ 1831-1832.
39. Under the AWPA, an agricultural employer may be liable to the farm workers for
statutory violations. Id. § 1854(a). The AWPA defines an agricultural employer as “[a]ny person
who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin, packing shed or
nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs,
furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker.” Id. § 1802(2). Thus, the
AWPA is broader than the FLC, which allowed suits to be brought against only the labor
contractor. See, e.g., Flores v. Ignacio, No. 78 Civ. 5017, 1981 WL 2283, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
15, 1981) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6441) (noting that
Congress was explicit in differentiating labor contractors from farm owners); Marshall v.
Heringer Ranches, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (same); Salinas v. Amalgamated
Sugar Co., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 311, 316 (D. Idaho 1972) (holding that the FLC extended only to
actors having personal contact with laborers).
40. See Marion Quisenbery, A Labor Law for Agriculture: The Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act, 30 S.D. L. REV. 311 (1985).
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over the farm owner. Furthermore, by adopting the joint-employer doctrine,
the AWPA sharply diminished the value of the independent contractor rule that
had been used in the past to circumvent federal protections.41 The FLC
originally construed the definition of “employer” too narrowly, and, as such, it
limited the prospective defendants to only the independent labor contractor.42
By choosing to incorporate the joint-employer doctrine as a central measure of
the AWPA, however, Congress took notice of the unique labor and
employment co-existence between the migrant worker and the farm owner
present in the agricultural context. It is the farm owner’s land on which the
migrant worker works, and the farm owner who typically pays the worker.
Congress recognized that the farm owner was not a passive party in the abuses
of migrant workers. Under the AWPA, a farm labor contractor who has
supplied a crew and the farmer on whose farm the work is being performed are
potential joint-employers, and both may be sued by the migrant worker for
civil violations.43

41. A federal regulation provides:
The term joint employment means a condition in which a single individual stands in the
relation of an employee to two or more persons at the same time. A determination of
whether the employment is to be considered joint employment depends upon all the facts
in the particular case. If the facts establish that two or more persons are completely
disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee, a joint
employment situation does not exist.
29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2002). Moreover, as the House Education and Labor Committee
commented:
[W]here an agricultural employer or association asserts that the agricultural workers in
question are the sole employees of an independent contractor . . . [and the] labor
contractor is found to be a bona fide independent contractor, [such] status does not as a
matter of law negate the possibility that an agricultural employer or association may be a
joint employer of the harvest workers and jointly responsible for the contractor’s
employees.
H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553.
42. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 39. Section 1802(3) reads: “The term ‘agricultural employment’ means
employment in any service or activity includ[ing] . . . the handling, planting, drying, packing,
packaging, processing, freezing, or grading prior to delivery for storage of any agricultural or
horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state.” 29 U.S.C. § 1802(3). For the definitional
difference between a migrant worker and a seasonal worker, see infra note 45. For further
information on the use of the joint-employer doctrine under the AWPA, see 29 C.F.R. §
500.20(h)(4). For cases concerning the issue of joint-employment see, for example, Haywood v.
Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 584-92 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 487
(D. N.J. 1986). For an examination of the joint-employer doctrine in the migrant farm worker
context, see Marc Linder, The Joint Employment Doctrine: Clarifying Joint Legislative-Judicial
Confusion, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1989) (“The [House] Committee’s
adoption of the ‘joint employer’ doctrine was deliberately made for it presented the best means by
which to insure that the purposes of [the AWPA] would be fulfilled.”). This Comment focuses on
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Protections Afforded Farm Workers Under the AWPA

The AWPA separates the protections afforded migrant workers from those
afforded the seasonal agricultural workers.44 The main difference between a
migrant worker and a seasonal worker is where the worker resides while
employed on a farm.45 The migrant worker is afforded slightly more
protection than the seasonal worker; however, this difference is irrelevant for
purposes of this Comment, which considers only the migrant worker.46 A
major protection granted to the migrant worker is that the farm employer must
disclose—in writing—information relating to the job at the time the laborer is
recruited for employment.47 This information includes: (1) where the farm
suits by migrant workers against the non-resident farm owner and does not attempt to cover
causes of actions against the labor contractors.
44. See supra note 38; see infra note 46.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1808(8)(A), (10)(A). “[T]he term ‘migrant agricultural worker’ means
an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary
nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence.” Id. §
1802(8)(A). Exempt from the status of migrant workers are “any immediate family member[s] of
an agricultural employer or a farm labor contractor.” Id. § 1802(8)(B)(i). Further exemptions
apply to “any temporary nonimmigrant alien who is authorized to work in agricultural
employment in the United States.” Id. § 1802(8)(B)(ii). In contrast, “the term ‘seasonal
agricultural worker’ means an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a
seasonal or other temporary nature and is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent
place of residence.” Id. § 1802(10)(A). The same exemptions that apply to the definition of
migrant workers also apply to seasonal workers. Id. § 1802(10)(B)(i)-(iii). This Comment is
concerned with only the migrant agricultural worker. In fact, the issue of lack of personal
jurisdiction over a farm owner would rarely be an issue in a suit initiated by a seasonal
agricultural worker because the seasonal worker would most likely reside in the same forum as
the defendant farm owner. Furthermore, for a comparison of the definition of migrant workers
under the AWPA with that of the definition under the FLC, see supra note 29.
46. Section 1821(c) requires that farm employers post housing conditions offered to the
migrant workers. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(c). This provision is not included in the seasonal worker
protection provisions. See id. § 1831. This is because the seasonal worker does not reside at the
farm. See id. § 1802(10)(A).
47. See id. § 1821(a); see also Sanchez-Calderon v. Moorhouse Farms, 995 F. Supp. 1098,
1105 (D. Or. 1997) (holding the AWPA requires that farm owners provide workers with accurate
information relating to employment terms, and does not only apply to future terms, conditions,
and existence of employment); H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4562 (noting that a farm owner’s responsibility to provide information
begins at recruitment and continues until records are no longer needed). Under 29 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(1), the records must be kept for at least three years. These informational requirements
are great protections because they provide migrant workers with knowledge of their rights so that
they are aware when such rights are being violated. This Comment, however, is not concerned
with the actual substantive rights afforded to migrant workers, but rather is only concerned with
the procedural problems of asserting these rights in courts of law. To be complete, the AWPA
does offer additional protections to the migrant workers. Farm owners are required to meet
statutory criteria in paying migrant workers their wages earned. Id. § 1822(a)-(c) (stating
protections for migrant agricultural workers). This section provides, as follows:
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work is to take place;48 (2) the wage that the migrant worker will be paid;49 (3)
what type of work the migrant worker will be involved in;50 (4) the length of
time that the migrant worker will be required to work on the farm;51 (5) what
benefits other than wages the workers will receive;52 (6) whether the migrant
workers are being recruited to work at a farm that is currently witnessing a
strike;53 (7) “the existence of any arrangements with any owner or agent of any
establishment in the area of employment under which the [farm employer] is to
receive a commission or any other benefit resulting from any sales by such
establishment to the workers”;54 and (8) information relating to insurance
policies available for the workers.55 Because of the joint-employer doctrine,
the farm owner must transmit this information, which is a major change from
the FLC. These written disclosures given to the migrant worker provide
support in litigation arising from later violations concerning the terms of the
work agreement. The protections also give migrant workers a fair chance to
determine whether employment will best suit their needs, and it does not leave
the migrant workers at the mercy of finding out the nature of their jobs when
they are hundreds of miles from their homes.
Another provision of the AWPA requires farm owners to place, in a
conspicuous location, a poster outlining the rights and protections offered to
the farm workers.56 Such posters must explicitly inform the workers of their
Wages, supplies, and other working arrangements
(a) Payment of wages
Each farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, and agricultural association which
employs any migrant agricultural worker shall pay the wages owed to such worker when
due.
(b) Purchase of goods or services by worker
No farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association shall
require any migrant agricultural worker to purchase any goods or services solely from
such farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association.
(c) Violation of terms of working arrangement
No farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or agricultural association shall,
without justification, violate the terms of any working arrangement made by that
contractor, employer, or association with any migrant agricultural worker.
Id. Also, migrant workers must be provided housing—if such housing is offered—that complies
with safety and health measures. Id. § 1823(a)–(c).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2000).
49. Id. § 1821(a)(2).
50. Id. § 1821(a)(3).
51. Id. § 1821(a)(4).
52. Id. § 1821(a)(5).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6).
54. Id. § 1821(a)(7).
55. Id. § 1821(a)(8).
56. Id. § 1821(b). The Labor Secretary has the responsibility to provide these posters to the
farm employers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.75(c) (2002). The posters must be displayed during the full
course of employment. Id. § 500.75(g) (“If the terms and conditions of occupancy are disclosed
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rights to request the statutorily mandated information from the employer.57
Furthermore, the AWPA requires the farm owner to place, in a conspicuous
area, a poster regarding the housing terms and conditions offered to the
workers, if such offers are made and accepted.58 Moreover, the farm owner is
responsible for preserving records relating to the amount of wages paid to the
workers, the number of hours worked by the migrants, and the net payments
that the migrant workers receive.59 The farm owner has a duty to provide
workers with a written statement that itemizes the required information for
each pay period.60 This itemization requirement is another tool that the
workers will find useful if disputes as to proper pay or hours worked arise
during or after the course of the migrant laborers’ employment. Finally, all of
the information that the employer is required to give must be in writing and “in
English or, as necessary and reasonable, in Spanish or other language common
to migrant agricultural workers who are not fluent or literate in English.”61
2.

Private Right of Action Under the AWPA62

Because the AWPA holds farm owners—not simply the labor contractor—
responsible for statutory violations, it provides for more expansive use by
migrant workers than the FLC allowed, with the result being that the AWPA is
better able to remedy violations.63 Although the AWPA addressed the limited
scope of the FLC,64 it is only effective to private rights of actions if it can be
properly employed in the judicial system. In other words, to ensure the
effectiveness of the AWPA, migrant workers must be able to assert personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident farm owner.

to the worker through a statement (rather than through a posting), such statement shall be
provided to the worker prior to occupancy.”).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 1821(b). The information that must be disclosed to the migrant workers,
if they request such information, is that listed under 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a). See supra notes 48-55
and accompanying text.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(c).
59. Id. § 1821(d)(1).
60. Id. § 1821(d)(2). Such information relating to the pay period that must be itemized is
enumerated in the AWPA. See id. § 1821(d)(1). Moreover, the AWPA requires that wages are to
be paid to the worker at the time they are due. Id. § 1822(a); 29 C.F.R. § 500.81 (2002) (the farm
owner must pay the worker at least semi-monthly).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(g).
62. The AWPA provides for criminal and administrative penalties as well. See id. §§ 1851,
1853. A farm owner that “willfully and knowingly” refuses to abide by the provisions of the
AWPA may be fined up to $1,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or both. Id. § 1851(a).
Subsequent violations of the AWPA may result in a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to
three years in jail, or both. Id. Anyone violating the provisions of the AWPA may also be civilly
penalized an amount up to $1,000 per violation. Id. § 1853(a)(1).
63. See 7 U.S.C. § 2048(a)-(c) (1976), repealed by AWPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1982).
64. See Linder, supra note 43, at 321-22.
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As for a private right of action, the AWPA allows aggrieved parties to file
suit in any district court having subject matter jurisdiction.65 Although the
AWPA is federal legislation, compliance with supplemental state law is still
mandated by the statute, and no individual may be excused from complying
with such state laws.66 A claim under the AWPA will be successful against a
farm employer if the court finds that the employer intentionally violated the
provisions of the statute.67 The plaintiff migrant worker may receive damages,
including actual damages, and statutory damages not exceeding “$500 per
plaintiff per violation,” or other fair remedies.68 In determining damages, the
court may take notice of whether or not the parties to the case attempted to
settle their disputes prior to filing suit.69 The total amount awarded to the
aggrieved party must, as a policy objective, be enough to encourage workers to
assert their rights by litigating violations of the AWPA.70
Where a migrant worker has coverage under a state worker’s compensation
plan, however, the worker’s compensation scheme is the sole remedy that the
migrant worker may obtain if he dies or suffers bodily harm on the job.71
Finally, Congress has provided that the statute of limitations for bringing a
private right of action under the AWPA is tolled for the period during which
the state worker’s compensation claim is pending.72
The AWPA clearly evinces Congress’s intent to strengthen migrant
workers’ rights, but it does not have its full intended effect because the AWPA
does not allow personal jurisdiction to be asserted through nationwide service
of process. Under the AWPA, lawsuits may be filed only in district courts that
have jurisdiction over the parties.73 Thus, migrant workers with legitimate
claims under the AWPA will often find themselves at the steps of closed
courtroom doors if personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted over the defendant
farm owner.

65. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (2000). The AWPA does not require that the aggrieved party
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a federal suit. Id.
66. Id. § 1871.
67. Id. § 1854(c)(1).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 1854(c)(2).
70. Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying policy objective to FLC).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(d)(1).
72. Id. § 1854(f).
73. Id. § 1854(a).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

912

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:899

III. THE SUPREME COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE74
The current personal jurisdiction analysis is nearly sixty years old. The
history of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases displays the extent to which
the Court has left that doctrine in confusion. Section A details the historical
progression of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases, while Section B
discusses some of the problems with applying the Court’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine.
A.

Historical Analysis of the Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Cases

The issue of the constitutionality of a forum state’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.75 The Due Process Clause disallows a state from “mak[ing]
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”76 International Shoe
Co. v. Washington77 is the seminal case laying the foundation of the modern
personal jurisdiction inquiry. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court took a
major turn from its prior personal jurisdiction doctrine by abrogating the rigid
rule that required a defendant to be physically present within the territorial

74. This section deals only with the issue of specific personal jurisdiction and not general
personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has defined general personal jurisdiction as “[w]hen a
State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984). In contrast, the Court has defined specific personal jurisdiction as
“when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 414 n.8. In the hypothetical problem underlying
this Comment, supra Part I, general jurisdiction rarely will be asserted over the defendant because
the defendant is almost always unattached from the forum state apart from the contacts related to
the cause of action. In fact, in no case regarding personal jurisdiction in the migrant farm worker
context did a court determine whether general jurisdiction was applicable. See, e.g., Ochoa v.
J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002); Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201
(5th Cir. 1992); Chery v. Bowman, 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990); Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk
Train, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002); Villalobos v. N.C. Grower’s Ass’n, Inc., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 131 (D.P.R. 1999); Astorga v. Connleaf, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Or.
Harvesting, Inc. v. Villarreal, No. 91-215-DA, 1991 WL 575856 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 1991);
Moncevoir Hyppolite v. Gorday, No. 89-1843-CIV-NESBITT, 1990 WL 80684 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
22, 1990); Lopez-Rivas v. Donovan, 629 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1986) (holding personal
jurisdiction issue moot for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 476
N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985); de la Cerda v. Hutchinson, No. 93-1743, 1994 WL 255873 (Tex.
County. Ct. Mar. 8, 1994); Orchard Mgmt. Co. v. Soto, 463 S.E.2d 839 (Va. 1995); Surrillo v.
Drilake Farms, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1991).
75. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). See supra notes 14, 17.
76. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
77. Id. at 310.
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boundaries of the forum state before it could assert in personam jurisdiction.78
The Court concluded that the “terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ [were] used
merely to symbolize those activities of [a] corporation’s agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process.”79 The Court found that the activities of a non-resident defendant that
have been “continuous and systematic” as well as that “give rise to the
liabilities sued on,” as opposed to “conduct of a single or isolated items of
activities in a state” not connected to the cause of action, will yield a
constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction, regardless of the physical
presence of the defendant.80 According to the Court, “the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a [defendant] to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be . . . mechanical or quantitative.”81 The Due
Process Clause would not be offended if the non-resident defendant has
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”82
The personal jurisdiction doctrine announced by the Court allowed for a
flexible, but vague, constitutional standard.83
In 1957, the Supreme Court reevaluated the personal jurisdiction doctrine
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.84 The Court in McGee noted the
continuing expansion of the reach of a state’s long-arm statute.85 The Court
78. See id. at 317. The Supreme Court broadened the territorial boundary test laid down in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877). Such an analysis by the Court, in leaving the rigid test
of Pennoyer and choosing to allow a flexible standard of minimum contacts, is a prime example
of the notion that personal jurisdiction is a constitutional doctrine that has adapted to the changing
times. See Joelle Lee A. Nicol, Note, Given an Opportunity to Redefine the Gray Area of
“Minimum Contacts,” the Court in Prince v. Urban Chose to Remain in the Dark, 25 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 313, 316 (1998) (stating that “[s]ociety had become much more mobile since the Pennoyer
decision” and thus the Court found a basis to re-adjust its personal jurisdiction analysis).
79. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
80. Id. at 317.
81. Id. at 319.
82. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
83. See id. at 323 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority for
“engag[ing] in an unnecessary discussion . . . which . . . has announced [a] vague Constitutional
criteria”). Justice Black argued that by announcing a “minimum contacts” standard for personal
jurisdiction, the Court had “depriv[ed] a State’s citizens of due process by taking from the State
the power to protect them . . . .” Id.
84. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the petitioner had
recovered a judgment against the International Life Insurance Co. in California, and the petitioner
then attempted to enforce such judgment in a Texas state court under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Id. at 221. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution states: “Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to . . . every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
85. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222 (finding historical development of personal jurisdiction doctrine
as displaying “a trend [that] is clearly discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents”). For a treatment on the need for
evolution in the determination of minimum contacts, see Nicol, supra note 78.
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found that such an expansion of the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction
was “attributable to the fundamental transformation of [the] national
economy.”86 In a functionalist opinion, the Court concluded that “[i]t is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had [a] substantial connection with [the forum].”87 The majority
carefully considered the fact that if such an allowance of personal jurisdiction
were not satisfied in the case, the petitioner and others in similar positions
would be “at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
[defendant] to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.”88 In
essence, by expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction, the Court ensured the
result that the non-resident defendant would not be shielded from judgment
whenever bringing suit in the defendant’s forum would be cost-prohibitive to
the plaintiff.89

Notwithstanding the many disparate approaches that the courts use to determine the
existence or absence of personal jurisdiction, one common theme emerges: the facts of a
given case cannot be analyzed in a vacuum but must instead be examined against a
backdrop of changing societal and technological mores. Thus the concept of personal
jurisdiction is not static; rather it is a construct whose dynamics are continually evolving
in response to ever changing stimuli.
Any court not recognizing or responding to the imperatively evolutionary nature of
the personal jurisdiction concept runs the risk of applying outdated standards and
imposing injustice.
Id. at 313.
Along similar lines of expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction were the proposals to allow
nationwide jurisdiction in personam in federal question cases. See Robert C. Casad, Personal
Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX L. REV. 1589, 1620 (1992) (concluding that in
federal question cases, “state courts can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate state
causes of action over alien defendants who have minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole,” and further that “Congress may . . . have the power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact measures eliminating the necessity for the International Shoe inquiry [of
minimum contacts] in all cases”). Moreover, a state’s long-arm statute is a means by which the
forum court may assert personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. Although the state
may enumerate the manner in which a non-resident may be subject to suit in the state, the longarm statute must be in constitutional harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, as interpreted by the Court. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 639 n.14 (1990)
(Brennan, J., plurality).
86. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
87. Id. at 223. A functionalist opinion is a decision that is based on the “spirit” that the law
espouses and is readily adapted to a changing society. See Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing
Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 582 (1992).
88. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
89. Id.
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One year after McGee, the Court returned to molding the personal
jurisdiction doctrine in Hanson v. Denckla.90 In Hanson, the Supreme Court
held that Florida could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over a
Delaware trust company.91 In reaching its conclusion, the Court furthered the
due process analysis by adding two standards to the personal jurisdiction
doctrine: (1) “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot” be considered a minimum contact
necessary for personal jurisdiction; and (2) “it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”92 In this sense, the Court narrowed the
acceptable reach of a state’s long-arm statute over non-resident defendants.93
If a case were to allow for the exercise of personal jurisdiction without a
finding of these additional criteria, the non-resident defendant would be subject
“to litigation in a distant forum, the selection over which the nonresident had
no control.”94
In 1980, the Court, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
redefined its personal jurisdiction doctrine by addressing the concept of
foreseeability.95 The Court severely limited the use of the mere foreseeability
of a chattel entering the territorial boundaries of the forum as a conclusive
basis for minimum contacts for fear that “[e]very seller of chattels would in
effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.”96 Such a notion

90. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a settlor of a trust from Pennsylvania had appointed a
trust company from Delaware to be the trustee of assets from such trust established in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 238. The trust settlor then moved from Pennsylvania to Florida and
executed a power of appointment over her trust. Id. at 239. Following the death of the trust
settlor, the executrix of the trust attempted to obtain a judgment over the trust company in a
Florida state court. Id. at 239-41.
91. Id. at 256.
92. Id. at 253. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (holding that the
unilateral act of a plaintiff, in moving from New York to California and then enforcing judgment
over her divorced husband who was a resident of New York, after defendant ex-husband sent
their child to live with the plaintiff mother in California, did not give a California court personal
jurisdiction over defendant ex-husband because he did not purposefully avail himself of the
benefits and protections of California laws).
93. The Court narrowed the sense of “minimum contacts” again by restricting such
determinative contacts to the relationship between “the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (discussing a quasi-in rem proceeding). The Shaffer
Court also noted the underlying theme of the personal jurisdiction doctrine as that of being an
adaptable and flexible standard. See id. at 212 (concluding that the Due Process Clause “can
be . . . readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified”).
94. Nicol, supra note 78, at 319.
95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
96. Id. at 296.
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would offend due process.97 Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is not offended if the non-resident
defendant “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”98
Although the Court was secure in applying a minimum contacts analysis to
find that personal jurisdiction over the defendants would offend due process,
the Court noted in dicta that personal jurisdiction centers on the
reasonableness of a forum state’s assertion of power over the defendant. The
Court maintained that the defendant’s burden from litigating in a distant forum
was of primary interest in determining whether personal jurisdiction would be
valid. The Court also stated that the reasonableness of asserting personal
jurisdiction should include: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute”; (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies”; and (4) “the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”99 The Court
found that minimum contacts is not the sole criteria upon which personal
jurisdiction would be decided. Rather, specific contexts may call for finding
personal jurisdiction when the weight of the reasonableness factors is
sufficiently heavy to find in favor of such power. In evaluating the
constitutionality of a forum state’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s contacts with
the forum and litigation should have led him to “reasonably [have]
anticipate[d] being haled into court” in the distant forum.100
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz101 was the Court’s next major case
regarding the reasonableness inquiry of asserting personal jurisdiction. In
finding that personal jurisdiction existed in Burger King, the Court noted that
“an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone” cannot
“automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home
forum.”102 Additionally, the Court affirmed that, in appropriate cases, the
reasonableness factors, previously stated in dicta in World-Wide Volkswagen,
According to the Court, the
must be taken into consideration.103

97. Id. (noting that “foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”). See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,
239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) (criticizing the application of the forseeability method to find
minimum contacts later rejected in World-Wide Volkswagen because its use would result in a
“serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce between the states”).
98. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
99. Id. at 292 (citations omitted); see also supra note 17.
100. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
101. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
102. Id. at 478.
103. Id. at 477.
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reasonableness factors would establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant
even where minimum contacts seem attenuated.104 Inverting this reasoning
indicates that a defendant with minimum contacts sufficient to have
purposefully benefited from the laws of the forum still may not be subject to
personal jurisdiction if, for example, the burden to litigate in a distant forum
would be too great a hardship. Burger King separated the issue of personal
jurisdiction into two discrete tests—one of minimum contacts and the other of
the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over the non-resident—
with each having a certain level of influence over the other.105
The last major case that the Supreme Court decided regarding the issues of
fair play and reasonableness with respect to the personal jurisdiction doctrine
was Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.106 Although the Court issued
only a plurality opinion regarding the issue of minimum contacts,107 it came to

104. Id.
105. For an analysis this issue, see Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and
Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal
Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 441 (1991); see also Walter W. Heiser, A”Minimum
Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 938 (2000)
(criticizing the Court’s development of its personal jurisdiction test as “car[ing] more about
constitutional theory than outcome”). Heiser argued that the Court wishes to reach an answer
compatible with its interpretation of the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not to reach an answer that is equitable. Id.
106. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
107. Although the Court clearly agreed on an outcome, the analysis demonstrated the
Justices’ diverging views regarding minimum contacts. Four Justices, led by Justice O’Connor,
found that in cases where a product has entered a forum through a stream of commerce and
thereby caused an injury should not lead to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 108-116. An assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a suit regarding that product would be
contrary to the defendant’s Due Process guarantees unless additional conduct by the defendant
toward the forum existed. Id. The O’Connor plurality determined that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112. Justice O’Connor concluded that additional conduct
on the part of a defendant such as: “designing [a] product” geared toward the state, “advertising”
within the state, “establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in
the forum State” as possible examples of a defendant “purposefully direct[ing]” acts toward the
state if the defendant was aware “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into
the forum State . . . .” Id. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, wrote for another four justice
plurality when he stated that “[a]s long as a participant in [the stream of commerce] is aware that
the final product is being marketed in the forum State,” such participant should reasonably
anticipate the possibility of being sued in that forum state. Id. at 117. Brennan argued that
someone who puts goods into the stream of commerce will benefit economically from the product
being sold in the forum state. Id.
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a unanimous decision regarding the ultimate outcome of the case—denial of
personal jurisdiction.108
After applying the reasonableness factors, the Court determined the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the alien defendant company was
unreasonable.109 The Court found the international context of the dispute to be
a significant reason for finding personal jurisdiction unreasonable. Forcing the
defendant to litigate an indemnification suit so far from its home forum—
especially when the home forum is a different country—was too burdensome.
The Court, therefore, refused to find that a constitutional assertion of personal
jurisdiction existed.110
B.

Personal Jurisdiction Problems Today

As it currently exists, the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is not welldefined.111 Deciding at what level minimum contacts are sufficiently
established is not an easy task. Although this Comment does not attempt to
argue that the minimum contacts rationale should be abandoned entirely, there
108. See id. at 116 (denying personal jurisdiction based on the unreasonableness of haling a
Japanese party into a California state court to litigate an indemnity suit against a Taiwanese party
because of “the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and
the forum State”). The situation of the suit at issue in Asahi is quite intriguing. A California
resident sued a Taiwanese motorcycle tire tube manufacturer in a products liability suit in a
California state court. Id. at 105-06. The Taiwanese company, in turn, sought indemnification
from the manufacturer of the tube’s valve, a Japanese party. Id. at 106. Later, the original
plaintiff to the suit settled his case out of court leaving two alien parties, one Taiwanese, the other
Japanese, to litigate across an ocean in California. Id.
109. Id. at 114. See supra note 17 (discussing the Court’s unreasonableness of personal
jurisdiction standard); see also supra text accompanying note 99.
110. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116. Of particular relevance in Asahi is the concurring opinion of
Justice Stevens. Stevens argued that the fractured Court should not even bother to perform a
minimum contacts analysis because the Court had already determined an assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the Asahi Corporation to be unreasonable. Id. at 121 (“An examination of
minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state court’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”) (Stevens, J., concurring). Seemingly, Stevens implicitly
stated that the minimum contacts analysis is not even applicable as a constitutional standard. The
Court always starts with an examination of minimum contacts and then decides the
reasonableness factors. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)
(concluding that the “constitutional touchstone [of personal jurisdiction] remains whether the
defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). If, however, Stevens were to argue for starting with a
determination of reasonableness before minimum contacts, one could possibly arrive at the
paradoxical conclusion that jurisdiction in personam would comport with fair play and substantial
justice, but at the same time not be valid because of a lack of minimum contacts. In this case, the
conclusion one could draw from Justice Stevens’s reasoning is that only the reasonableness
factors of Burger King be examined, and minimum contacts be disregarded.
111. For a severe criticism of the Court’s personal jurisdiction approach and a proposed
“minimum interest” method for determining personal jurisdiction, see Heiser, supra note 105.
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is reason to question the validity and benefits of its application.112 Even
though the Court has asserted that the minimum contacts test is met when the
defendant has “reasonably anticipated” being haled into court, applications of
the personal jurisdiction doctrine are not so easily conducted. For example,
what does it actually mean for the cause of action to arise out of the
defendant’s contacts? On this issue, the Supreme Court has seemingly left the
This uncertainty has resulted in a
circuit courts in disagreement.113
voluminous amount of litigation concerning minimum contacts.114
Furthermore, the issue of personal jurisdiction may be raised after the trial
court has rendered its decision, thus draining appellate resources. This
indicates that judicial resources may be more efficiently utilized with a clearer
standard guiding courts.115
Although the current personal jurisdiction doctrine needs revision, this
Comment does not intend to delve into the possible remedies to this situation,
but rather focuses on the narrow issue of the necessity for nationwide service
of process for claims brought under the AWPA. The very fact, however, that
the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis is vague116—and possibly
unworkable—gives added strength to the argument that the AWPA be given a
nationwide service of process amendment.

112. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Craft of Due Process, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 477, 483
(2001) (“Typically, new factors [to the minimum contacts test] have been added [by the Court]
without acknowledgment or justification of departure from past practice and with little if any
attempt to integrate innovations with prior cases.”).
113. See Michael J. Neuman & Assocs. v. Florabelle Flowers, Inc., 15 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir.
1994) (making no reference to purposeful availment standard in personal jurisdiction analysis, but
rather simply concluding that because defendant’s representative made periodic visits to the
forum, jurisdiction was satisfied). Compare Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223
F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000) (employing “but for” test), and Lanier v. Am. Bd. of
Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that purposeful availment is met
through the “but for” test), with Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1260 (1st
Cir. 1990) (employing “legal or proximate cause” test), and In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding personal jurisdiction when
consequences in the forum were “made possible” by defendant’s contacts and actions).
114. Russel J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 531, 531-32, 531 n.5 (1995) (finding more than 2,000 cases litigated on the minimum
contacts test between 1990-1995).
115. See Partick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried
Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 583 (1995) (stating that “[t]he realistic chance of reversal
generated by the confusing and unstable [personal jurisdiction] doctrine invites appeals”).
116. The problems in effectively using the personal jurisdiction analysis devised by the Court
dates back to the very beginning of the minimum contacts analysis. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 323 (1945) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court has
not chosen to [provide a workable standard], but instead has engaged in an unnecessary
discussion [of minimum contacts] in the course of which it has announced [a] vague
Constitutional criteri[on].”).
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IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT FARM OWNER—
SUBSTANTIVE CASE LAW
As discussed above, the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine is the source
of a number of problems. Several of these problems have been reflected in the
migrant farm worker context. This Part will analyze four appellate-level
cases—three from the federal courts of appeals and one from New York’s
highest court—dealing with the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be
asserted over the non-resident defendant farm owner. As shown below, these
cases often contain flaws or stretch legal theories to find personal jurisdiction.
Alternatively, contacts are often simply too attenuated to satisfy due process.
In either situation, these cases demonstrate that whether migrant workers can
bring suit against farm owners will be uncertain, because of the Court’s
personal jurisdiction doctrine.
A.

Cases Finding Personal Jurisdiction
1.

The Ninth Circuit: Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc.

In April 2002, the Ninth Circuit decided, in a functionalist approach,
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc.117 In this case, a farm owner residing
in New York requested the help of a Texas-based labor contractor in recruiting
migrant workers to help for the upcoming cabbage and squash harvests.118 The
labor contractor, knowing of an existing surplus of farm workers in Arizona,
agreed to recruit and transport migrant workers from Arizona to New York.119
The workers were orally promised their rights under employment, including
wage rates and housing conditions.120 The migrant workers, however, alleged
that while working on the New York farm, the farm owner, Martin Farms,
provided substandard housing and failed to pay wages due.121 Upon returning
to Arizona, the migrant workers filed suit in a federal district court in Arizona
claiming Martin Farms violated the AWPA.122 Unfortunately, the migrant
workers found the courtroom doors closed when the district court determined
that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over Martin Farms consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.123
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided the issue of personal jurisdiction
based upon whether an agency relationship had existed between the Texas

117. 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002). For an understanding of a functionalist opinion, see
supra note 87.
118. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1186.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1187.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1186-87.
123. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1187.
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labor contractor and Martin Farms.124 The court found that because the labor
contractor had purposefully directed his activities toward the state of
Arizona,125 personal jurisdiction could be asserted over the farm owner if an
agency relationship existed between the labor contractor and Martin Farms.
This was a form of vicarious personal jurisdiction.126 Ultimately, the court
held that the labor contractor was an agent—not an independent contractor—of
Martin Farms, and that the activities of the agent could count as minimum
contacts sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over the principal Martin
Farms.127
In deciding that an agency relationship existed between the farm owner
and labor contractor, the court stretched to satisfy the requirements for finding
agency. For example, the court considered eight factors to determine whether
an agency relationship existed under Arizona law.128 Those factors included:
(1) the farm employer’s level of control over the labor contractor; (2) the
“distinct nature” of the labor contractor’s business; (3) the particular skills and
specialization of the labor contractor; (4) the materials and work location
involved; (5) the length of time the labor contractor was employed by the farm
owner; (6) the method with which the farm employer paid the labor contractor;
(7) “the relationship of work done to the regular business of the employer”;
and (8) the belief of the farm owner and the labor contractor as to whether an
agency relationship actually existed.129 The Court found that Martin Farm’s
ability to exercise control over the labor contractor, the labor contractor’s lack
of specialization and skills, and the relationship of the work to the regular
business of Martin Farms all pointed in the direction of an agency
relationship.130
Upon closer examination, one will note that the balance between those
factors tending to prove an agency relationship and those tending to prove that
the labor contractor was an independent contractor was fairly even—until the
court considered the fourth (the materials and place of work)131 and first
(Martin Farms’ level of control over the labor contractor)132 factors. As for the
fourth factor, the court noted that because Martin Farms supplied tools for the
migrant farm workers and controlled the migrant workers’ work area, an

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1189-92.
Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1190-92.
See id. at 1189; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1189-91.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1190.
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agency relationship likely existed between it and the labor contractor.133 This
proposition, however, establishes a relationship between the farm owner and
the migrant workers. The labor contractor is not even considered in this factor,
yet the court still uses it to find that an agency relationship existed between the
farm owner and the labor contractor. This inconsistency may be explained by
recognizing that were the court to find no agency, it would have necessarily
resulted in affirmation of the district court’s decision—a result the court likely
believed to be inequitable. The court focused the reasonableness standard of
personal jurisdiction on the fact that the migrant workers were “of very limited
means,” citing national statistics regarding the poverty levels of migrant
workers to support the fact that jurisdiction was reasonable.134 It is unclear,
however, why national statistics of migrant workers should impact the
reasonableness test of Burger King; after all, they do not directly concern the
parties involved.135
As for the first factor—Martin Farms’ level of control over the labor
contractor—the court stated explicitly, “Martin Farms exercised very little dayto-day control over [the labor contractor’s] recruitment and management of
the . . . migrant workers.”136 Nevertheless, the court decided that Martin Farms
had the ability to give instructions to the labor contractor and expect that such
instructions be carried out.137 The court explicitly concluded that little control
over the labor contractor existed, yet it still maintained that this factor
contributed to an agency relationship.
The court was clearly persuaded to find jurisdiction consistent with due
process in this case because of the extreme hardship and problems—in light of
their financial conditions—that the migrant workers would face litigating their
claim in New York. In finding personal jurisdiction based upon the minimum

133. Id. at 1191. Finding an agency relationship based on the fourth factor—the materials
and work location involved—is quite a stretch because it is the labor contractor that must be
supplied tools and designated a controlled work area, not the migrant worker, for a finding of
agency with the labor contractor to exist. One possibility is that the court was simply
sympathetic to the plight of the migrant workers and therefore stretched the rules of law to “open
the courtroom doors” to hear their claim.
134. Id. at 1192 & n.6 (citing that only 10% of migrants are provided vacation benefits and
over 60% live in poverty). For a more in-depth analysis of the socio-economic conditions of
migrant workers, see infra Part VI.A-C.
135. See supra note 17. The reasonableness factors in determining personal jurisdiction over
the defendant are directed toward the defendant involved in the litigation, and not to a
hypothetical defendant as portrayed through national statistics. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (“Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself . . . with the forum State.”).
136. Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1190.
137. Id.
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contacts standards of the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit manipulated the
determination of the agency relationship to help the workers.138
A minimum contacts analysis conducted by the Supreme Court would
clearly point to the fact that the farm employer did not himself benefit from the
protections of Arizona’s laws. He benefited only vicariously through the labor
contractor; however, the Ninth Circuit’s manipulation of the first and fourth
factors obscures whether such a form of vicarious personal jurisdiction even
existed through the Ochoa agency analysis. The problem that results from
such an analysis is that determining whether personal jurisdiction will exist in
the migrant worker cases becomes much too unpredictable.
2.

The Court of Appeals of New York: Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc.

In 1985, the highest court of New York dealt with the issue of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident farm employer in Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc.
(Rios II).139 Rios II involved migrant workers in Puerto Rico trying to enforce
Puerto Rican default judgments against New York apple growers in the forum
of New York.140 The defendants in this case delivered clearance order forms
(that is, job offers) to the Department of Labor’s Interstate Clearance System,
requesting farm labor help.141 The Labor Department, in turn, distributed the
defendant’s job offers to various forum states as well as Puerto Rico.142 At no
time did the New York defendants request that Puerto Ricans be hired for
employment, and at no time before employment did the New York defendants
have any contact with the Puerto Rican migrant workers.143 The defendants
were contacted by the Labor Department regarding the Puerto Rican workers’
acceptance of employment, and the migrant workers began work on the New
138. Such a construction of the agency analysis is commendable for its recognition of the
need to protect the low-income migrant workers. The price paid, however, is straying from the
law—the defendant’s due process guarantees. One must remember Chief Justice Marshall’s
powerful statement that “there must be [a] rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803). Although Marbury
concerned an issue of proper subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, as opposed to personal
jurisdiction, the need for the “rule of law” should be equally applicable in all legal contexts.
139. 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985) (hereinafter Rios II).
140. Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), rev’d, 476
N.E.2d 312. The Court of Appeals of New York adopted the dissenting opinion from the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division’s case as its official opinion. Rios II, 476 N.E.2d at
312. For the sake of clarity, this Comment labels the opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of
New York as Rios II, and it labels Justice Levine’s dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division’s case as Rios. The facts of Rios II were taken directly by the Court of
Appeals from Rios. See id.
141. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 521. The Interstate Clearance System is the mechanism that farm
employers must engage in when they wish to hire alien workers. For an understanding of the use
of this mechanism, see infra note 165.
142. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
143. Id.
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York farms.144 Problems, however, between the workers and the employers
ensued, and the plaintiffs left New York to return home.145
Following the termination of their employment, the migrant workers filed
suit against the defendants in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, where the
court granted default judgment.146 The migrant workers then attempted to
enforce the judgment in the courts of New York, but the defendants argued that
the Puerto Rican forum did not originally have personal jurisdiction over
them.147 The Supreme Court of New York held that personal jurisdiction
existed, but the Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed the trial court.
Adopting the dissenting opinion of Justice Levine,148 the Court of Appeals of
New York reversed, finding that the defendants had indeed established
minimum contacts in Puerto Rico, and an assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with fair play.149
In concluding that a constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the New York defendants existed in Puerto Rico, Justice Levine relied heavily
on the fact that the defendants “were made aware that the job orders were
physically delivered to Puerto Rican employment offices . . . well before the
date [of employment] was to commence.”150 Levine found that the defendants
had received information regarding not only the number and names of workers
that were to report to work in New York, but also health records and other
administrative information submitted during the application process.151 Upon
examining the totality of circumstances, Levine concluded that the defendants
had, in fact, established minimum contacts with Puerto Rico.152 He declared
that the defendants had “purposefully sent [the clearance orders] into the
stream of interstate commerce,”153 and were fully aware that the clearance
orders could have the potential of being acted upon in Puerto Rico. Thus, the
defendants were believed to have “deliberately set in motion the job

144. Id.
145. The plaintiff’s allegations were that the defendants breached their contract and
committed torts. Id. The causes of action were not based upon violations of the AWPA because
the AWPA had not yet been enacted. This is of little consequence, however, since this Comment
is concerned not with the substantive law of the AWPA, but rather with the procedural aspects of
asserting the AWPA in court.
146. Id. The migrant workers alleged that the defendant farm owner had violated the
Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Id. at 521.
147. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
148. Rios II, 476 N.E.2d at 312 (reversing the order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division
“for [the] reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Justice Howard A. Levine”).
149. Rios, N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Levine, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 525.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 526.
153. Id. at 526.
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recruitment machinery of the interstate clearance system.”154 From this stream
of commerce rationale, the minimum contacts between the forum, the
litigation, and the defendant were established.
As for the reasonableness inquiry of personal jurisdiction, Justice Levine
was heavily influenced by the burden that the Puerto Rican plaintiffs would
encounter litigating their claim in New York.155 After comparing the relative
burdens that the migrant workers and the defendant employers would face in
litigating in New York and Puerto Rico, respectively, Levine concluded:
[F]air play and justice demand that plaintiffs be permitted validly to litigate
their claims in their home forum. Plaintiffs here are impoverished, Englishilliterate farm workers. Economic and logistical realities render them totally
incapable of obtaining legal redress for their complaints in the courts of New
York. Defendants, on the other hand, are ongoing business entities. They
have already demonstrated their willingness to act collectively and share the
costs of litigation in the Federal courts, as well as in the New York courts in
the matter now before us. It may reasonably be assumed that the common
defense to all of the claims asserted by these plaintiffs would basically entail
testimony from a few supervisory employees concerning defendants’
justification for discharging plaintiffs. Imposing the burden of producing such
witnesses in Puerto Rico hardly amounts to a denial of due process, when a
converse ruling effectively would confer total immunity from suit upon
defendants.156

The economic realities facing the migrant workers would have made the
defendants “judgment proof” had the defendants been forced to go to New
York.157 This is because the migrant workers would not be economically
capable of litigating an entire case so far away from home.
In adopting the dissenting opinion of Justice Levine, the Court of Appeals
of New York erred. Justice Levine’s reasoning is not in accord with the
forseeability that a chattel will enter the stream of commerce rationale laid out
by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen. As Justice White declared
only five years before the decision in Rios II, “the foreseeability that is critical
to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum state.”158 The Rios II defendants merely were aware of the
154. Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (Levine, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 525-28.
156. Id. at 528.
157. See id.; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
158. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Rios II was
decided before the Supreme Court’s plurality split in Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Justice Brennan opined that “[so] long as a participant in [the stream
of commerce] is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Nevertheless,
the weight of the cases seems to be in favor of the “stream of commerce plus” theory. See supra
note 107. For cases arguing that the “mere likelihood” that a product enters the stream of
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fact that the interstate clearance orders would enter the stream of commerce by
the unilateral act of the Department of Labor and be carried into Puerto Rico.
Importantly, the defendants did not “purposefully [avail themselves] of the
privilege of conducting activities within [Puerto Rico].”159
Additionally, Levine’s reasoning is contrary to the rationale supporting of
the Court’s McGee decision.160 Unlike the facts in McGee, where the
defendant was fully aware with whom it was contracting before the insurer
accepted the insurance, the defendants in Rios II did not know who the migrant
workers were before the offers of employment were accepted.161 Minimum
contacts should not have been established in Levine’s dissenting opinion, and
therefore the New York high court erred in adopting Levine’s opinion.162
B.

Cases Finding Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
1.

The Eleventh Circuit: Chery v. Bowman

In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case Chery v.
Bowman.163 Chery involved a suit under the AWPA in a Florida federal court
between the plaintiff migrant workers from Florida and the Virginian
defendant farm owner Bowman.164 After deciding that he would need foreign
agricultural workers to help on his farm, Bowman complied with the
Department of Labor’s requirement of submitting clearance order forms to the
Interstate Clearance System to ensure job opportunities went to U.S. migrant
workers before foreign workers.165 The Department of Labor distributed the
commerce is not enough to establish minimum contacts, see Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967
F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that non-resident defendant’s “awareness that the [injurycausing product] might end up in [forum]” was not enough for minimum contacts); Falkirk
Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
“placement of a product [by defendant] into the stream of commerce, without more,” is not
enough for minimum contacts).
159. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
160. McGee, 355 U.S. at 220.
161. See id.; Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 522, rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985).
162. Levine’s reasoning, however, regarding the reasonableness of jurisdiction provides
useful support for this Comment’s position that the AWPA should be amended to include a
nationwide service of process statute when asserting personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.
Justice Levine pointed out that fair play and justice “demand” that the defendant be haled into the
migrants’ home forum, mainly due to the poor conditions of migrants, as analyzed infra Part VI.
See Rios, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Levine, J., dissenting), rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312.
163. 901 F.2d 1053 (11th Cir. 1990).
164. Id. at 1053-54.
165. See id. at 1054. For an understanding of how the Interstate Clearance System functions
through the Wagner-Peyser Act, the law requiring the use of the Interstate Clearance System, see
20 C.F.R. § 655.201 (2001). This regulation provides that:
An employer who anticipates a labor shortage of workers for agricultural or logging
employment may request a temporary labor certification for temporary foreign workers by
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clearance orders to employment offices in states where there was an excess
supply of farm labor, including Florida.166 Thereafter, a plaintiff farm worker
from Florida drove to Virginia seeking agricultural work.167 At a Virginia
employment office, the plaintiff telephoned Bowman’s agent in order to set up
possible employment for the plaintiff and his crew.168 The plaintiff told
Bowman that his crew would be comprised of workers from Florida.169
Although the clearance orders that Bowman filed with the Labor Department
stated that the plaintiff would be reimbursed for travel fees, neither Bowman
nor his agent supported the plaintiffs in their journey to Virginia.170 After only
a few days of work, Bowman fired the workers who, in turn, filed suit in a
Florida federal court claiming that Bowman violated the AWPA.171
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the case by stating that, although
the AWPA creates federal rights and allows for a private right of action, the
personal jurisdiction analysis must be conducted in accordance with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s minimum contacts test because the AWPA does not
contain a provision for nationwide service of process.172 The court followed

filing, or by having an agent file, in duplicate, a temporary labor certification application,
signed by the employer, with a local office in the area of intended employment.
Id. § 655.201(a)(1). The regulation further mandates that:
Every temporary labor certification application shall include . . . [a] copy of the job offer
which will be used by the employer (or each employer) for the recruitment of both U.S.
and foreign workers. The job offer for each employer shall state the number of workers
needed by the employer, and shall be signed by the employer.
Id. § 655.201(b)(1). See also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 594-96
(1982) (concluding that the purpose of the Interstate Clearance System is to give preference
regarding jobs to domestic workers over foreign workers, to make sure that the working
conditions of domestic workers are not affected negatively by the entering of foreign workers into
the employment stream, and to prevent any discrimination of domestic workers in favor of the
alien hired hands).
166. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1054.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1054-55.
170. Id. at 1055.
171. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1055.
172. Id. at 1055 & n.2. Because no service of process provision or statute was present, the
federal court could only exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants who would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the forum state in which the court was located. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(k)(1)(A) (2000) (“Service of a summons . . . is effective to establish [personal jurisdiction
over a defendant] who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state in which the district court is located.”); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1987) (refusing to make an inference that nationwide service of
process might exist when Congress had not explicitly enacted such a provision). The court in
Chery only focused on whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction would be compatible with
due process as interpreted by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its
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the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction standard by concluding that
Bowman did not establish the minimum contacts with Florida necessary to
have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court there.”173 The only
contact that the court found to exist between Bowman, the Florida forum, and
the litigation was the forwarding of clearance orders by the Labor Department
to the Florida employment office.174 The court noted that Bowman only knew
of the fact that Florida had received the clearance orders; at no point, however,
did he request that such orders be delivered there.175 Thus, the unilateral
activity of the Department of Labor could not create sufficient minimum
contacts to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction.176 The court further
noted that, even if the dispersal of clearance order forms could be considered a
contact, the single transmission of Bowman’s orders to Florida was too
attenuated to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.177
The court in Chery rightly decided the issue of minimum contacts.178
There was no showing whatsoever that Bowman had purposefully directed his
activities toward the Florida forum. Bowman did not benefit from any of the
privileges and protections of the laws of Florida. In fact, the migrant workers
did not even accept the employment offers from Bowman in Florida; rather,
they accepted the offers in Virginia.179 The circumstances of the job offers in
Chery were far removed from the purposefully directed activity of the
defendant negotiating a contract to be governed by Florida laws in Burger

progeny because it was unsure as to how the Florida long-arm statute was different from the due
process standards required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1055 n.2.
173. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1056 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1057. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Because the Department
of Labor distributed the clearance orders to Florida by itself—a unilateral activity—that contact
with Florida could not be a minimum contact established by the defendant. Chery, 901 F.2d at
1056-57.
177. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1056-57.
178. In fact, trial courts that decided the issue in favor of personal jurisdiction when the
Interstate Clearance System was involved usually found more contacts by the defendant than just
the dispersal of the clearance forms. See, e.g., Neizil v. Williams, 543 F. Supp. 899, 904 (M.D.
Fla. 1982) (finding that farm employer sent clearance order to Department of Labor and
specifically named a forum labor contractor to recruit in that forum); Garcia v. Vasquez, 524 F.
Supp. 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that farm employer sent clearance orders, made telephone
calls to the employment office in the forum state, and provided workers traveling expenses
through the employment office in the forum state). But see Villalobos v. N.C. Growers Ass’n,
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 131, 140 (D.P.R. 1999) (finding that farmers and association that submitted
clearance orders “reasonably should have known recruitment was likely to take place” in a forum
traditionally known for a surplus of migrant workers).
179. Chery, 901 F.2d at 1057.
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King.180 Because minimum contacts could not be established in Chery, the
court did not inquire as to whether an assertion of in personam jurisdiction
would be reasonable.181
2.

The Fifth Circuit: Aviles v. Kunkle

In 1992, the Fifth Circuit considered the issue of personal jurisdiction
within the migrant worker context in Aviles v. Kunkle.182 In Aviles, families of
migrant farm workers filed suit in a federal district court in Texas alleging,
inter alia, that the record keeping requirement of the AWPA had been violated
by their Ohio farm employers, two brothers named Kunkle and their Florida
foreman, Felix.183 The plaintiffs alleged that several of them worked on the
Kunkles’ farm in Ohio during the 1982 harvest and many accepted positions
for the following year.184 In early 1983, a representative of Felix made a call
from Florida to one of the migrant workers, who was still in Texas, informing
her of the start date for the harvest.185 An unknown individual then wrote to
another migrant worker on behalf of Felix requesting the worker to report to
the Ohio farm by early summer.186 The migrant workers receiving these
contacts from Felix’s representatives shared the information among other
migrant workers in Texas.187 The migrant workers arrived for work in Ohio on
time, but they were delayed from beginning the harvest because of certain crop
failures.188 The district court in Texas found personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident defendants on these limited contacts and held them to be
sufficient to meet the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements.189
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit began its discussion in Aviles
by noting that, because the AWPA made no mention of service of process, the
boundary of personal jurisdiction in federal court was limited to that of the
state court where the federal court is located.190 Because the Texas long-arm
statute allowed for personal jurisdiction to be asserted co-extensively to the
limits allowed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court
decided the case based upon the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
180. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985) (finding sufficient
contacts when the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff that established a franchise
relationship in Miami “governed by Florida law, and call[ed] for payment of all required fees and
forwarding of all relevant notices to the Miami headquarters”).
181. See Chery, 901 F.2d at 1057.
182. 978 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 203 & n.1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 203.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 203-04.
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doctrine.191 The court noted that the trial court had prefaced its assertion of
personal jurisdiction on the limited findings of “the partial performance of a
contract in Texas, the partial commission of a tort in Texas, and the
recruitment of Texas residents in Texas for employment outside the state.”192
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that the migrant workers’ cause of
action did not arise out of any of the contacts in Texas, but rather arose out of
the activities of the parties in Ohio. The court decided that the violation of the
AWPA “arose out of [the migrant workers’] employment at the Kunkles’ Ohio
farm during the 1983 . . . harvest, [and] not out of any contacts upon which the
district court predicated its exercise of personal jurisdiction.”193 Contacts
consisting of one telephone call and one letter that occurred with the Texas
forum were not enough to establish that the defendants should have
“reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” 194 in Texas because there
was not sufficient evidence that the defendants “purposefully avail[ed]
[themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities” within the state.195 The
Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the trial court, and the migrant farm
workers were barred from continuing their suit in the courts of Texas.196
The Fifth Circuit’s determination that personal jurisdiction was lacking
rested on its interpretation that the cause of action did not arise out of the
contacts between the defendant, litigation, and the forum state.197 If the
Supreme Court were to approve such a narrow interpretation of the “arises out
of” element of specific personal jurisdiction, it is unclear whether any rights
violated under the AWPA will ever arise out of the contacts between the nonresident defendant and the migrant workers’ forum. Violations of the AWPA
will necessarily take place in the forum state of the farm owner. Because the
migrant workers’ rights will not be violated until they have begun work—in
the forum of the farm owner—the farm owner never has reason to make
employment decisions that would violate the AWPA anywhere outside of his
own forum. Furthermore, the reasoning in Aviles is at odds with the Supreme
Court’s decision in McGee.198 In that contract-based claim, a narrow reading
of the “arises out of” element would lead to the conclusion that the refusal of
the insurance company to pay the premium to the plaintiff arose out of the

191. Id. at 204. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) (reasoning that
the Texas long-arm statute is sufficiently broad enough that it collapses into the due process
standard of the Fourteenth Amendment).
192. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 204 (footnotes omitted).
193. Id. at 205.
194. See id.; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
195. See Aviles, 978 F.2d at 205; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
196. Aviles, 978 F.2d at 205.
197. This is one area of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis that was noted for
its vagueness. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 113.
198. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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activities of the insurance company in its home state of Texas because the
decision not to pay was effectuated at the office. Such a strict interpretation,
however, cannot be in accord with the notion of personal jurisdiction as an
evolving standard.199 Like the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the actions of
the defendant in McGee, the actions of the defendants in Aviles should have
been interpreted broadly, thus fitting more closely with the evolving standard
of personal jurisdiction.
C. The Migrant Worker–Personal Jurisdiction Cases Are Unpredictable
The cases analyzed in the above Section display the problems of predicting
whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners
will be constitutional. When courts find personal jurisdiction to exist, their
analyses contain flaws or stretch legal theories to reach decisions that are
sympathetic to the plight of the migrant workers.200 In other cases, the contacts
between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation are simply too attenuated
to conclude that minimum contacts have been established consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Because the outcomes of Ochoa and Rios II, and
perhaps even Aviles, should have come out differently, these opinions display
the problems that migrant workers will face in asserting personal jurisdiction
by following the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test—namely, being
unsure whether a suit against the farm owner will be viable in the courts.
As previously noted, Congress has the power to amend the AWPA in order
to allow for migrant workers to serve process on defendant farm owners on a
nationwide basis. Part V details Congress’s ability in doing so.
V. ANALYSIS OF NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS
Given the socio-economic conditions of migrant workers201 and the lack of
predictability in asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident farm owners,
amending the AWPA to allow for nationwide service of process202 when

199. See supra note 85.
200. See Rios v. Altamont Farms, Inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 520, 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(Levine, J., dissenting) (asserting that “fair play and justice demand that [the migrant workers] be
permitted validly to litigate their claims in their home forum”), rev’d, 476 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y.
1985). Never after International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), did the Supreme
Court hold that personal jurisdiction existed without minimum contacts, except in the case of
transient personal jurisdiction, as evidenced in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (holding that the “constitutional
touchstone [of personal jurisdiction] remains whether the defendant purposefully established
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State” (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316)). But see supra
note 110.
201. See infra Part VI.A-C.
202. “Congress has provided for nationwide service of process on a number of occasions, and
it undeniably has the power to do so . . . .” Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A
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jurisdiction over the defendant would be reasonable203 would strengthen
migrant workers’ access to justice. Section A of this Part details Congress’s
power in enacting nationwide service of process legislation and the judicial
interpretation of the constitutionality of such provisions. Section B will
discuss the reasonableness of haling a non-resident defendant to litigate in a
foreign forum through use of nationwide service.
A.

Legal Analysis Regarding Nationwide Service of Process Statutes

Traditionally, Congress has had broad power to extend the long-arm
jurisdiction throughout the United States without much restriction by the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.204 This application of personal jurisdiction
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was derived in some notion
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s bar to personal jurisdiction outside of the
territorial boundaries of a forum.205 Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, the limit on a federal court’s reach on personal jurisdiction is
at the borders of the United States. Under this construction of the Fifth
Amendment’s limitation of reach, Congress has the ability to grant to federal
courts the right to assert personal jurisdiction over any defendant regardless of
whether the defendant has any contacts with the precise state in which the
federal court sits. After all, the federal court will naturally be within the
boundaries of the nation.206
Although the Court has maintained that minimum contacts test is the test to
determine whether a particular forum state may assert power over a nonresident defendant, per the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has yet to

Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 482 (1981). See also AM. L.
INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 437
(1969); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1587-88 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Congress may also
authorize worldwide service of process, see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), but
such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
203. See supra note 17.
204. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that: “No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. See,
e.g., Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd.,
268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
205. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 202, at
1587-88.
206. The Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test has, nevertheless, played an influential role
in such an analysis of nationwide personal jurisdiction. Thus, federal courts have often continued
to operate similarly to the Court’s traditional Fourteenth Amendment Due Process doctrine of
minimum contacts by asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant only if the defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States, instead of a particular forum state within the United
States. See, e.g., Lorelei Corp. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 720 (1st Cir. 1991);
Duckworth v. Med. Electro-Therapeutics, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 822, 826 (S.D. Ga. 1991).
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determine whether nationwide service of process statutes are constitutional
under the Fifth Amendment since International Shoe Co. v. Washington.207
The only direction the Court has offered in this area comes from Justice
Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Stafford v. Briggs.208 Stewart maintained that
due process in the personal jurisdiction analysis requires that minimum
contacts be present “between the defendant and the sovereign that has created
the court.”209 He accepted the minimum contacts analysis from International
Shoe when applied to the nationwide service of process statute in question, but
he did not apply that analysis in the same way that the Court had previously
interpreted due process.210 Stewart interpreted the minimum contacts test in
Stafford to be those contacts that the defendant has in connection with the
United States as a nationwide forum.211 The forum in this analysis, therefore,
is not the state in which the district court sits, because Stafford was not a case
under the Fourteenth Amendment—a restriction on the power of states.
Rather, Stafford involved the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—a
restriction on the federal government. Consequently, Stewart found that when
nationwide service of process is made on a United States resident, no Fifth

207. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In a case involving the Clayton Act, the Court sidestepped the
issue of whether nationwide service would be constitutional. United States v. Scophony Corp. of
Am., 333 U.S. 795, 804 n.13 (1948). See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000). The service of process
provision of the Clayton Act provides that:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
Id. § 22.
208. 444 U.S. 527, 545 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court in Stafford
held that a statute providing for nationwide service in limited situations did not apply to the cases
that were before the Court. See id. at 553 (discussing the petitioner’s due process claim). The
Court in Stafford consolidated two court cases. Id. at 530-33. The statute in question (Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962) provided that in “[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color
of legal authority” the suit may be brought against the defendant “in any judicial district in
which . . . a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000). Service of “[t]he summons and complaint in such an action . . . may be
made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.”
Id. Although the Court in Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S.
97 (1987), discussed the issue of nationwide service of process, it did so only to conclude that
such a form of service of process was not relevant in the case. See id. at 106 (concluding that
nationwide service of process cannot be found to exist implicitly because Congress is aware of
how to authorize such a type of service of process, and therefore when it failed to do so, it was the
intention of Congress to not allow such a means of service).
209. Stafford, 444 U.S. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Amendment due process problem would exist.212 Stewart was content in
disregarding a consideration as to the unfairness of requiring a defendant to
litigate in an unreasonably distant forum when the Fifth Amendment was at
play.213 According to the lone Justice that has considered the constitutionality
of nationwide service of process statutes (albeit over twenty years ago),
Congress has absolute power to grant federal courts the power to hale a
defendant into the court to litigate when hearing issues dealing with federallycreated rights, so long as the nationwide minimum contacts test is met. In any
case, it would be fairly evident that the defendant would have established
sufficient minimum contacts with the sovereign of the United States when the
defendant is, in fact, located in the United States. The issue of nationwide
contacts would only be relevant when the defendant is an alien party, or when
he lives overseas.
B.

Reasonableness of Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause

Clearly, the historical notion that Congress may grant nationwide service
of process unfettered by the constitutional limitations of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment is at odds with the fifty-plus years of the Court’s
evolving personal jurisdiction analysis. Although Justice Stewart’s dissent in
Stafford did not delve into a detailed analysis of why unreasonably burdening a
defendant in traveling far from his home would not affect the constitutionality
of personal jurisdiction, Stafford (1980) was decided before the Court headed
in the direction of the “reasonableness” factors that it relied upon in Burger
King (1985) and Asahi (1987).214 Thus, if the same issue was contested today,
the inquiry would be different.
The Fourteenth Amendment places constitutional restrictions on states
from unreasonably burdening a defendant by forcing him to litigate in a distant
forum. It seems counterintuitive, therefore, to allow Congress, simply because
it is constrained by the Fifth Amendment, to impose those very same burdens

212. Id.
213. Id. Justice Stewart did consider whether a defendant being unduly burdened in litigating
in a distant forum would still have legal recourse to remedy the problem. See id. at 554. Stewart
noted that federal district courts will “look sympathetically upon a motion for a change of venue
in any case where [the defendant] could show that he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit
were not transferred to a more convenient forum.” Id. Federal district courts have this venue
transfer power under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). “For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.” Id.; Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743
F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that the fairness concern is addressed by forum non
conveniens); Hogue v. Milodon Eng’g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that
the fairness concern is dealt with by federal venue requirements).
214. See supra note 17.
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that the Fourteenth Amendment seeks to prevent. Proposals that the Fifth
Amendment restrict Congress in similar ways to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
restriction on a state’s right to assert personal jurisdiction have developed.215
One federal Court of Appeals has focused on allowing the reasonableness
standard of the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine—developed to prevent
the defendant from an unreasonable burden of litigation—to play a key role in
restricting the federal courts from asserting personal jurisdiction under the
Fifth Amendment.216 Furthermore, some commentators have viewed the Fifth
Amendment’s due process standard to be that of general fairness to the parties
test as opposed to a “contacts test.”217

215. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee’s note. See also Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 735, 805 (1981). In the migrant worker context, a farm employer residing and owning
his farm in the United States will always have minimum contacts with the United States by the
very presence of his farm production in the United States because the direct and proximate causes
of action under the AWPA will arise out of events on that farm. This is because the migrant
workers are working on farms in the United States.
216. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945-46
(11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the reasonableness standard under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause is included in the Fifth Amendment’s governing standard allowing for
federal nationwide service of process); see also Lescs v. Martinsburg Police Dep’t, No. 02-5062,
2002 WL 1998177, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002) (concluding that although nationwide service
of process statute exists, haling West Virginians into federal court in Washington, D.C., was
unconstitutional because “the ends of justice [would] not [be] served”). But see Lisak v.
Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that when federal question
subject matter jurisdiction has been established, the Constitution is no bar to nationwide service
of process). The Court has not decided the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause has any effect when personal jurisdiction is established per nationwide service of
process. The philosophy of two of the Court’s cases may be integral if the Court should ever
choose to hear the issue. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990)
(asserting that personal jurisdiction over a defendant served with process while physically in the
forum state is traditionally and historically reasonable) (Scalia, J., plurality), with Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.”). If the Court takes the view
of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Burnham over that of the “liberty interest” rationale in
Insurance Corporation of Ireland, minimum contacts may have no application in a Fifth
Amendment due process analysis, just like it did not in Scalia’s analysis in Burnham. Burnham,
495 U.S. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., plurality).
217. See, e.g., Casad, supra note 85, at 1601-02 (discussing the view that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause should account for an overall fairness test as opposed to a
national contacts test). For cases indicating, however, that even where a nationwide service of
process statute applies, the defendant must still have contacts with the forum state as the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates, see Doll v. James Madison Martin Assocs. (Holdings) Ltd.,
600 F. Supp. 510, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 567 F. Supp.
1331, 1336-37 (D. Colo. 1983).
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It is crucial at this juncture to remember that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause is a restriction on the assertion of personal jurisdiction by
a particular forum state over a non-resident of that state. In federal question
cases in federal court involving nationwide service of process, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only when the defendant is not a resident of
the United States.218 When considering, therefore, the fairness of the forum
into which the defendant is being dragged, the Court’s interpretation of the
reasonableness factors is not completely on point. Such an interpretation is
one well-suited for state court jurisdictional issues, but not for federal court
jurisdictional issues under nationwide service of process.219 One legal scholar
has proposed that the Court examine a broad view of the parties in determining
whether personal jurisdiction would be reasonable in nationwide service of
process cases. Factors included would be a realization that the congressional
purpose in providing for nationwide service is to provide for a convenient
forum for the plaintiff (putting less emphasis on the defendants’ rights), the
particular transaction underlying the lawsuit and its relationship to the forum,
and the nature of the litigation and its relationship to the forum.220
It is quite inefficient, however, to put aside the Court’s reasonableness
factors when determining the fairness/reasonableness inquiry of personal
jurisdiction in nationwide service cases. After all, the factors are already set
out by the Court and are ready for use. Because the Court has not explicitly
decided the constitutionality of nationwide service of process statutes, and
given the fact that the Court has left the reasonableness factors of Burger King
alone for over fifteen years, it seems very likely that Congress would have the
power to enact a nationwide service of process statute based on a nationwide
minimum contacts analysis. In addition, the burden of persuasion in the
unconstitutionality of jurisdiction, due to extreme hardship to the defendant,
would rest upon the defendant.
VI. MIGRANT WORKERS AND THE NEED FOR A NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF
PROCESS AMENDMENT TO THE AWPA
A nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA will not only
diffuse the unpredictability that exists in asserting personal jurisdiction over
farm owners, but it will also help migrant workers to assert their rights in
courts located close to the security of their personal residences. When migrant

218. See generally Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
219. For a discussion on construing a reasonableness standard for personal jurisdiction cases
under nationwide service of process statutes, see the very thorough analysis in Robert A. Lusardi,
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1988).
220. See id. at 40.
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workers’ socio-economic conditions are considered, amending the AWPA
provides migrant workers with a useful tool to better their lives on an
aggregate level.
This Part is subdivided into five Sections that portray the difficulties
migrant workers will face in trying to understand, let alone use, the complex
legal system. Section A will set forth a brief overview of the general lifestyle
of a migrant worker. Section B will detail the problem of poverty that has
stricken migrant workers. Section C will discuss the migrant worker’s lack of
education, which makes them more vulnerable to farm owners taking
advantage of them. All three Sections give substantial support for allowing
migrant workers to litigate their claims under the AWPA near the security of
their homes. Section D will consider the problem of finding legal
representation in the farm employer’s state. This lack of legal assistance is a
major justification for a nationwide service of process amendment to the
AWPA. Finally, Section E suggests the application of a nationwide service of
process amendment to the AWPA.
A.

The Migrant Worker’s Lifestyle

Today’s migrant workers are arguably worse off with respect to economic
and social progress than they were in previous decades.221 The conditions that
migrant workers face during the course of their sporadic employment is
unquestionably harsh.222 Migrant workers are often “subjected to . . . unsafe
equipment, unhealthy sprays and pesticides, crude and unsanitary living
conditions, exploitation in infinite ways by their . . . employers, [and] lack of
care of any kind by anyone.”223 As such, the migrant workers truly are pitted
at the lowest levels of the American social hierarchy. The migrant workers in
America feed this nation, yet few are accustomed to the American lifestyle.
Migrant workers “arrive where they’re needed . . . by necessity and, at times,
desperation.”224 Migrant workers accept the hardships of their daily toil
because they have little else to rely upon. “The powerlessness of farmworkers
breeds dependence, which serves to marginalize and isolate” them from other
possible advantages and opportunities available to others in society.225
Notwithstanding congressional recognition of the problems facing migrant
workers, the problems and abuses confronting migrant farm workers have not
been resolved.226 With little help from government enforcement of federal

221. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at x.
222. For a specific account of migrant work life in Texas, see Viviana Patino, Migrant Farm
Worker Advocacy: Empowering the Invisible Laborer, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (1987).
223. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, MIGRANT WORKERS: A CASTE OF DESPAIR 4 (1981).
224. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 2.
225. Id. at 25.
226. Id. at 50.
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statutes such as the AWPA, migrant workers have resorted to last-ditch efforts
of pleading their case to the consumers who purchase the fruits of their
labor.227
The generally harsh and uncomfortable lifestyle of migrant workers is
made even worse by the troubling factor that migrant workers are not able to
treat most health defects that may arise from their employment. Assurance of
ample health care is sometimes impossible for migrant workers to obtain.
They tend to suffer from diseases more often than the mainstream
population.228 The average migrant worker lives on this planet for less than
fifty years.229 “The infection and parasitic disease rates of migrants are 200500 percent higher than the national averages.”230 The atrociously substandard
environment that migrant workers endure breeds infections and diseases, and
coupled with low income levels, they simply do not have the advantages of
medical care that mainstream Americans take for granted.231 Little support for
remedying migrant workers’ health problems is found in the general
population, thus questioning the effectiveness that pleading their case to the
public will actually have.232 Moreover, the farm owners are often leading
advocates against health protections for migrant workers. The only person,
other than a possible labor contractor, that the migrant workers regularly
encounter during their employment simply does not care about them.233 Legal
woes aside, the day-to-day life of a migrant worker in the field can be a
struggle merely to stay alive.
B.

Migrant Workers—The Impoverished Class (Low Wages)

As mentioned above, agricultural fieldwork is not typically desirable
employment.234 Long hours, instability in length of employment, and low
wages are all contributing factors that make the life of a migrant worker

227. See John Nicols, Migrant Farm Workers Take Their Case to the Court of Public
Opinion, MARKET TO MARKET: THE WKLY. J. OF RURAL AM. (May 10, 2002), at
http://www.iptv.org/mtom/feature.cfm?Fid=108.
228. Nat’l Ctr. for Farm Worker Health, Inc., Fact Sheets About Farmworkers: Profile of a
Population with Complex Health Problems, at http://www.ncfh.org/factsheets_02.shtml (last
visited Mar. 21, 2003) (“The on-going battle to improve the health status of farmworkers has not
been easy, and is being lost.”).
229. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 34.
230. See id.
231. See id. (finding that “only 8 percent of migrant farm workers [see] a doctor each year”).
232. See id. at 38-39 (“Migrants are viewed as outsiders, as beneficiaries of . . . unnecessary
federal protection, [and] cause . . . drains on the overall local economy.”).
233. See id. at 39.
234. See generally DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & MONICA L. HEPPEL, BALANCING
ACTS: TOWARD A FAIR BARGAIN ON SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (1999) (hereinafter
BALANCING ACTS).
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difficult.235 A 1997 survey indicated that farm workers receive a weekly pay
rate of about $277, less than half of the median American worker.236 In fact,
the median annual income of migrant workers is usually capped near a
devastatingly low $5,000.237 Furthermore, it is unlikely that migrant workers
will have sufficient skills to obtain other forms of employment. This is
especially true when one considers the fact that farm work is only available in
sporadic cycles, making employment in non-agricultural settings fairly
complicated, because few employers outside of agriculture are willing to allow
workers to work only at sporadic time intervals.238 The unfortunate reality
facing the migrant worker is that little of his already limited income may be
feasibly saved. Debts incurred during the off work cycles coupled with the
fact that payment is needed for rent, clothes, and food undoubtedly leave the
migrant worker in a state of despair.239
A U.S. Department of Labor study conducted in March 2000 found that
nearly one-tenth of migrant workers were working at an hourly wage rate
below the federal minimum of $5.15 per hour.240 To exacerbate the problem,
real purchasing power of migrant workers in the United States has also been
declining.241 This low level of income has defined migrant workers “as the
poorest of American workers.”242
Aside from measuring the low flow variable of income, migrant workers
fare much worse than mainstream Americans when accounting for their stock
of wealth. Nearly one-third of migrant workers have no assets to call their
own. While the most common asset that a migrant farm worker owns is a
vehicle,243 half of all migrant workers do not have one. The fact that migrant
235. See id. at 10-11; GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 3 (finding that for migrant farm workers,
“[t]he work day is long . . . and with little rest”).
236. BALANCING ACTS, supra note 234, at 10. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Findings from the
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 1997-1998: A Demographic and Employment
Profile
of
United
States
Farmworkers,
at
33
(Mar.
2000),
at
http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report_8.pdf [hereinafter Findings from the NAWS]
(finding that the average reported hourly wage of farm workers is $5.94).
237. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, National Agricultural Workers: Income and Poverty, at
http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/agworker/report/ch3.htm [hereinafter National Agricultural
Workers: Income and Poverty] (last visited Mar. 21, 2003). “Three-fourth’s [of migrant workers
earn] less than $10,000 annually.” Id. Over 60% of migrant workers live below the national
poverty level. Id. This percentage has increased from 50% reported a decade ago, thus indicating
that the conditions of migrant workers are still deteriorating. Id.
238. Id. (asserting that three-fourths of migrant workers engage in farm work only).
239. See STEPHEN H. SOSNICK, HIRED HANDS: SEASONAL FARM WORKERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 68-69 (1978); see also ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 24-25 (concluding that migrant
workers “are forced to bear the burden of virtually all of the costs associated with” their work).
240. See Findings From the NAWS, supra note 236, at 33.
241. Id.
242. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 24.
243. See National Agricultural Workers: Income and Poverty, supra note 237.
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workers must—of necessity—travel to wherever work is available intensifies
the traveling expenses that the workers are likely to encounter.244
It is more than evident that migrant workers are, generally, poverty-striken
individuals. Entry into the legal system to remedy violations of personal rights
is complicated by the obstacle of financial woes. The procedural problem of
personal jurisdiction is only one more problem that migrant workers must face.
Congress can alleviate some of the difficulties of litigating violations under the
AWPA by amending the federal statute to allow for nationwide service of
process when personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. This would eliminate
the need for the Court’s minimum contacts test, which is too often
unpredictable.
C. Migrant Workers’ Lack of Education
In addition to the financial difficulties facing migrant workers face, their
lack of education weakens their ability to understand and use the legal system
to their benefit. In some sense, migrancy breeds migrancy. Education is a
useful key to unlocking closed doors blocking the path of migrant workers.
Migrant children, however, are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to
obtaining an effective education that could take them out of the migrant
environment.245 Because a migrant family is always on the move, it is very
rare for a migrant child to remain in one school and develop meaningful
educational qualities like children in mainstream America. The lack of
financial resources imposes a significant burden on migrant children from
obtaining the proper supplies necessary for a useful education. At home,
parents typically work long days in the field, which leaves the children with
little parental guidance and little hope that education will be garnered in the
home.246
The median education level of migrant workers is at about the sixth
grade.247 Furthermore, one-fifth of workers have not even completed more
than three years of formal education.248 Although the great majority of
migrant workers do not own English as a native language, but rather
Spanish,249 85% of farm workers report that they “would have difficulty

244. Id.
245. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 46. For a proposal of migrant educational reform, see
Michelle Holleman’s thorough Comment on the problems of the current educational workings in
place for migrant children. Michelle R. Holleman, Comment, All Children Can Learn: Providing
Equal Educational Opportunities For Migrant Students, 4 SCHOLAR 113 (2001) (footnote
omitted).
246. See GOLDFARB, supra note 223, at 46.
247. Findings From the NAWS, supra note 236, at 13.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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obtaining information from printed materials in any language.”250 To make
matters worse, migrant workers are so preoccupied with their day-to-day
struggles that the value of a meaningful education does not take precedence.
For example, as one migrant worker from Michigan stated, “Migrants only
think about today. They don’t think about what tomorrow might bring. That’s
why there’s lots of migrant parents that don’t take education seriously. They
can’t justify an education over having their kids be providers for the family.”251
It is therefore not surprising that “[m]igrant students are . . . the most
educationally disenfranchised group of students in [the] schooling system.”252
The problem with having an entire social class of children that remains unable
to obtain a meaningful education is that the social class necessarily will fail to
better itself. Migrant children usually grow to be migrant adults, and the
vicious cycle continues.253 The poor education of migrant workers will make it
difficult for the workers to understand the complex legal system designed to
protect them, let alone recognize that such rights as the AWPA exist.
D. The Problem of Finding Meaningful Legal Assistance
Because migrant workers as a class of individuals are some of the poorest
people in society, problems arise in simply finding competent attorneys that
are willing and able to assist them. Because of the lack of education in the
migrant communities, migrants without lawyers will have little hope in
litigating claims that they will not even be able to understand.
Equal justice for all is a fundamental concept embedded in this country’s
view of fairness. The quality of our judicial process is valued largely by the
service provided to those in poverty.254 Millions of Americans, however, lack
any access to the legal system at all, and an overwhelming majority of those in
poverty lack access to civil legal necessities.255 The problem that exists for
250. Id. at 16.
251. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 274 (interviewing Jose Martinez, a migrant worker from
Lawrence, Michigan). The failure to encourage migrant children to become educated is at the
root of the educational problem plaguing migrant workers. Migrant workers born into the system
grow up believing that what they have is all they can obtain out of life. See id. at 276; see also
Patino, supra note 222, at 46. Moreover, migrant children often face a hostile environment at
school, from not only peers, but also from teachers and administrators. See GOLDFARB, supra
note 223, at 47.
252. Ablerado Villarreal & Anita Tijerina Revilla, Creative Educational Opportunities for
Migrant Students, INTERCULTURAL DEV. RES. ASS’N NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1998), at
http://www.idra.org/Newslttr/1998/Feb/Lalo.htm.
253. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 3 (including a migrant worker’s statement about the fact
that he is such a worker: “See . . . you is you. You got that thing. You can’t be nobody else.
That’s why this name, migrant worker, stands tall.”).
254. Lewis J. Liman, The Quality of Justice, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 287, 287 (1998).
255. See, e.g., Access to Justice Development Campaign 2000: The Case for Support, 79
MICH. B.J. 370, 370 (2000); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First
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those in poverty, like migrant workers, is simply being able to find a lawyer
who is willing and able to provide legal assistance.256 Unlike many other
industrialized countries,257 the United States has never provided a guaranteed
right to legal assistance in civil cases.258 This is seemingly contrary to the
Supreme Court’s position in Griffin v. Illinois,259 where the Court noted “there
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.”260 Furthermore, “[t]he right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel.”261 Because migrant workers will not be guaranteed a right to
assistance of counsel in litigating their claims under the AWPA, and because it
is highly unlikely that migrant workers will be able to litigate themselves, due
to their extreme poverty and lack of education, they will necessarily turn to
civil public interest organizations, namely the Legal Services Corporation262
(LSC) for help. The connection between personal jurisdiction in the migrant
worker context and the use of the LSC by the workers has its origins in the
congressional restrictions placed on the LSC. These restrictions impact on the

Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 402 (1998). For one
judge’s proposal that the United States implement a “Civil Gideon,” see Hon. Robert W. Sweet,
Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503 (1998). “Civil
Gideon” refers to the proposed right to counsel in civil lawsuits. Id. at 503.
256. Patino, supra note 222, at 46 (noting that although legal protections for migrant workers
exist, “few legal advocates know how to use them”).
257. Great Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Greece, and the European
Court of Human Rights all have recognized the right to counsel in civil cases. See Sweet, supra
note 255, at 504.
258. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (asserting that the right to
appointed counsel only exists when the defendant “may be deprived of his physical liberty”). For
a summary of court cases that refuse to intervene to help financially downtrodden parties in civil
matters, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-35 to –52 (2d ed.
1988).
259. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
260. Id. at 19.
261. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
262. Congress established the LSC “for the purpose of providing financial support for legal
assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000). Congress noted that justice is best promoted when all
have access to legal services. See id. § 2996(3). The primary method for providing legal
assistance and services to the poor is through the LSC. See Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of The
Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice,
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 743-44. LSC serves clients in every state and county in the United
States, as well as Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Micronesia. See Legal Servs. Corp.,
Serving the Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans: A Special Report to Congress, at 1
(Apr. 30, 2000), at www.lsc.gov/pressr/EXSUM.pdf. The LSC was specially funded for assisting
the plight of the migrant workers. Id. Because this Comment is centered on the issue of personal
jurisdiction in the migrant worker context, an in-depth analysis into the workings of the LSC is
not warranted.
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forum in which migrant workers will be forced to sue their farm employer
under the AWPA.
In 1996, the United States Congress imposed certain restrictions on the
LSC. In addition to restricting the financial support that the LSC receives,
Congress enacted legislation restricting LSC attorneys from: (1) undertaking
class action lawsuits;263 (2) challenging state or federal welfare reform
legislation or regulations;264 (3) legislative lobbying;265 (4) participating in
administrative rulemaking proceedings;266 (5) representation of certain

263. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (2002). “Class action means a lawsuit filed as, or otherwise declared
by the court having jurisdiction over the case to be, a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. § 1617.2. For the federal requirements necessary for
classification as a class action in federal court, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) reads:
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Id.
264. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (2002) provides:
[Legal Service Corporation] recipients may not initiate legal representation, or participate
in any other way in litigation, lobbying or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a
Federal or State welfare system. Prohibited activities include participation in:
(a) Litigation challenging laws or regulations enacted as part of an effort to reform a
Federal or State welfare system.
(b) Rulemaking involving proposals that are being considered to implement an effort
to reform a Federal or State welfare system.
(c) Lobbying before legislative or administrative bodies undertaken directly or
through grassroots efforts involving pending or proposed legislation that is part of an
effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system.
Id.
This prohibition on LSC attorneys representing clients in challenging the welfare reform laws
was recently held to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). The Court in Velazquez did not
determine the constitutionality of the other restrictions placed on the recipients of Legal Services
Corporation. See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the
Courts?: Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers
on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 876 (2002). Abel and Udell argue that
Congress erred in restricting the LSC because doing so “interfere[s] with [the] core functions of
the courts.” Id. at 874.
265. 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (2002).
266. Id. § 1612.1. Another regulation provides:
[Legal Service Corporation] recipients shall not attempt to influence:
(1) The passage or defeat of any legislation or constitutional amendment;
(2) Any initiative, or any referendum or any similar procedure of the Congress, any
State legislature, any local council, or any similar governing body acting in any
legislative capacity;
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aliens;267 (6) representation of incarcerated persons in federal and state
prisons;268 and (7) representation of persons convicted or accused of illegal
drug activities in certain public housing eviction proceedings.269
These restrictions on the LSC have had devastating effects on the funding
available to legal aid lawyers. With respect to the financial effect of the 1996
federal restrictions, two commentators stated:
Over $780 million in funds are dedicated annually to the provision of civil
legal services nationwide. Several hundred million dollars come from federal
funding allocated to LSC, and hundreds of millions of additional dollars come
from federal, state and local governments, IOLTA funds, and private donations
(including those of foundations, corporations, bar associations, and lawyer
fund drives). The federal restrictions applicable to LSC funding encumber
approximately $329.3 million in 2002. These funds finance advocacy in more
than 200 legal services offices spread throughout the fifty states and several
federal territories. These offices provide representation in roughly one million
matters annually. The LSC restrictions also encumber almost $300 million of
the resources that LSC grantees receive annually from federal, state and local
governments, IOLTA funds, and various private sources. An additional $62
million in non-LSC funds carries an independent set of restrictions, imposed in
most instances by state or local governments or IOLTA governing structures.
In total, approximately $660 million in scarce legal services funding is

(3) Any provision in a legislative measure appropriating funds to, or defining or
limiting the functions or authority of, the recipient or the Corporation; or,
(4) The conduct of oversight proceedings concerning the recipient or the Corporation.
Id. § 1612.3(a).
267. Id. § 1626.3 (providing that LSC “recipients may not provide legal assistance for or on
behalf of an ineligible alien”).
268. Id. § 1637.3. This regulation states:
A recipient [of the Legal Services Corporation] may not participate in any civil litigation
on behalf of a person who is incarcerated in a Federal, State or local prison, whether as a
plaintiff or as a defendant, nor may a recipient participate on behalf of such an
incarcerated person in any administrative proceeding challenging the conditions of
incarceration.
Id.
269. Id. § 1633.3. This regulation states:
Recipients [of the Legal Services Corporation] are prohibited from defending any person
in a proceeding to evict that person from a public housing project if:
(a) The person has been charged with or has been convicted of the illegal sale,
distribution, or manufacture of a controlled substance, or possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to sell or distribute; and
(b) The eviction proceeding is brought by a public housing agency on the basis that
the illegal drug activity for which the person has been charged or for which the person
has been convicted threatens the health or safety of other tenants residing in the public
housing project or employees of the public housing agency.
Id.
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encumbered each year by restrictions: this amounts to about eighty-five
percent of all legal services funding.270

The encumbrances to funding caused by the federal restrictions are clearly
enormous.
The restriction having the most significant impact on a migrant worker’s
choice of forum when suing a non-resident farm owner is the restriction on
class action lawsuits.271 It will be more costly to serve rural groups, such as
migrant workers, with the increased emphasis on individual representation as
opposed to class action lawsuits.272 It is already the case that “civil legal
services to the poor in rural areas is more costly than in urban areas.”273
Without the use of class action lawsuits, LSC attorneys will be unable to
provide assistance to migrant workers on an individual basis, even when many
migrants may complain of the same violations by the same farm employer.
This is because the LSC will not have the financial capacity to accommodate
so many individual lawsuits.
Class action lawsuits are integral if migrant workers are to use effectively
the legal system. For example, migrant workers are likely to be geographically
detached, thus causing havoc in coordinating every worker’s individualized
presence at one court.274 The migrant class members will not necessarily be
fluent in English, and, therefore, they will not understand the legal system on
an individual basis.275 The migrant workers will lack financial resources to
take proper legal measures on their own.276 Also, migrant workers’ remedies

270. Abel & Udell, supra note 264, at 881 (footnotes omitted). “IOLTA” stands for “Interest
on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts,” and it provides financial support for legal aid to indigents
incapable of mustering an attorney’s fees to file a claim in court. See Tracy Daniel, IOLTA
Program Provides Access to Justice, 63 ALA. LAW. 369, 369 (2002).
271. Because migrant workers at a similar job site are large in number, the migrant workers
will file suit against the defendant farm employer together. This is usually done as a class action
lawsuit. See generally Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Carlson, 166
F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Wash. 1996); Aragon v. Bravo Harvesting, Inc., No. CIV-89-1282-PHX-RCB,
1993 WL 432402 (D. Ariz. May 7, 1993); Leyva v. Buley, 125 F.R.D. 512 (E.D. Wash. 1989);
Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
272. See Larry R. Spain, The Opportunities and Challenges of Providing Equal Access to
Justice in Rural Communities, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 367, 374 (2001).
273. See id. Even pre-dating the Congressional funding restrictions on the LSC, different
states conducting studies concluded that Legal Services attorneys were equipped to handle only
up to 20% of the civil legal needs in their populations. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy
Thoennes, Assessing the Legal Needs of the Poor in Colorado, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 200
(1986).
274. See Saur v. Snappy Apple Farm, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 281, 286 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
275. See id.
276. See id.
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in pursuing a private right of action under the AWPA are not sufficiently high
to entice them to file suits on individual bases.277
The relationship between the prohibition on class action lawsuits with
personal jurisdiction is best explained through a hypothetical.278 Suppose
migrant workers in state B decide that they want to sue a farm employer
residing in state A in a class action suit279 for violating the AWPA. The
migrants will have to sue the farm employer in state A if asserting personal
jurisdiction over the farm employer in state B is not constitutional. The
migrants, however, will still need to rely on LSC attorneys in state A to
provide legal assistance, but the LSC attorneys in state A may be so limited in
resources, and, of course, restricted in undertaking a class action lawsuit, that
the state A attorneys will not be able to provide assistance in litigating the
migrants’ claims. To intensify the problem, the workers will not be able to
comprehend the legal system they are engaged in (because of poverty and lack
of education),280 as well as having difficulty finding attorneys not associated
with the LSC to represent them (because there is no “Civil Gideon”).281 The
attorneys in state A will already be overburdened by their cases in state A, and
the end result is that the courtroom doors in state A will be closed to the
migrant workers. The migrants will be forced to litigate in their home state B,
but an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident farm employer
will be extremely unpredictable. Ultimately, it may be a lose-lose situation for
the migrant worker.
Magnifying the problem of LSC attorneys not being able to partake in
class action suits on behalf of the migrant workers is the likelihood that the
attorneys will be hesitant in accepting migrant worker cases at all. Such
attorneys—who are unable to finance resources necessary to represent the poor
effectively—will be unwilling to accept migrant worker cases because they
will be unsure whether courts in their home state will be able to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the farm owner. 282 Instead of wasting scarce
resources on claims that may be dismissed, 283 LSC attorneys will redirect their

277. See id. The court in Saur stated that “few claims [under the AWPA would] be litigated”
without the use of class actions. Id. at 287 n.4.
278. This Comment’s underlying hypothetical presented at supra Part I was that the migrant
workers were abused in the farm employer’s state after being hired by the farm employer, and the
workers then wished to pursue a cause of action in their home state.
279. See supra note 271.
280. See supra Part VI.B-C.
281. See Sweet, supra note 255, at 503. “Civil Gideon” refers to the proposed right to
counsel in civil lawsuits. Id. See also supra note 257.
282. See supra Part IV.
283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (stating that a party to a suit may, on motion to the court,
assert that the court has a “lack of jurisdiction over the [party]”).
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limited resources to claims that are more predictable, thus isolating migrant
workers further from the legal community.
E.

Applying the Nationwide Service of Process Amendment in the Migrant
Worker Context

The problems stemming from the lack of legal assistance available to
migrant workers will be relieved by making it easier for migrant workers to use
the legal system to their advantage.284 If the migrant workers cannot get into
the courtroom, then there is no opportunity that the AWPA will be effective in
reducing the abuses such workers face. Congress must amend the AWPA to
include a nationwide service of process provision so that the goals of the
AWPA can be effectively reached.285 More specifically, Congress should
enact a federal nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA that
provides for any district court having subject matter jurisdiction under the
AWPA to also have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The
amendment’s wording should include such language that a presumption of
constitutional personal jurisdiction would exist, but also that this presumption
may be rebutted by the farm owner in the very rare instances when haling the
farm owner into a distant state would be extremely burdensome.
Without a doubt, a certain level of unpredictability in determining personal
jurisdiction will remain if a per se reasonable nationwide service of process
amendment is not enacted. It is unlikely, however, that the Court would
uphold such an amendment as constitutional. This is especially true after the
long history of focusing on the defendant’s rights that the personal jurisdiction
doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment has witnessed.
In most cases, however, it will be such that personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident farm owner will be constitutional. The nationwide minimum
contacts test will be met when the defendant is within the borders of the United
States. In the migrant worker cases brought in federal district courts stemming
under the AWPA (a federal statute), the farm owner will be present within the
United States and will have conducted his farming activities that caused the
harm in the United States as well. The nationwide minimum contacts will not
really be relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but its presence in the
constitutionality of the nationwide service statute will save an alien farm owner
from an unfair assertion of a court’s jurisdiction over him.
284. The federal government has provided for funds to be allocated to the LSC so that its
attorneys may “prepare complaints and fund lawsuits against state agencies, [labor] contractors,
and [farm] growers.” ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 229. Although protections under the law,
such as the AWPA, exist for migrant workers, “few legal advocates know how to use” these laws
effectively to help assert the rights of their migrant worker clients. Patino, supra note 222, at 46.
285. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4547
(stating that the purpose of the AWPA is to reach the “goal of fairness and equity for migrant
workers”).
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As for the reasonableness of jurisdiction inquiry, the farm owner must
“present a compelling” case that the reasonableness factors warrant a finding
that jurisdiction is unconstitutional.286 To assert that a non-resident farm
owner would be per se forced to litigate in even the most burdensome forum
would be repugnant to the notion that the Court has continually supported the
due process rights of the defendant. As Judge Kravitch of the Eleventh Circuit
stated in Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.:287
In order to evaluate whether the Fifth Amendment requirements of fairness
and reasonableness have been satisfied, courts should balance the burdens
imposed on the individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the
litigation. As in other due process inquiries, the balancing seeks to determine
if the infringement on individual liberty has been justified sufficiently by
reference to important governmental interests.
. . . [C]ourts must engage in this balancing only if a defendant has
established that his liberty interests actually have been infringed. Only when a
defendant . . . has “present[ed] a compelling case that . . . would render
jurisdiction unreasonable” should courts weigh the federal interests favoring
the exercise of jurisdiction.
In determining whether the defendant has met his burden of establishing
constitutionally significant inconvenience, courts should consider the factors
used in determining fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts should
not, however, apply these factors mechanically in cases involving federal
statutes [because] . . . “[t]he due process concerns of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments are not precisely parallel.”288

It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court will simply disregard the fairness
rights of the farm owner because Congress is acting through the Fifth
Amendment.289
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress has the power to enact a nationwide service of process statute for
federally-created rights litigated in federal courts.
Only the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits this power. Such an assertion of
personal jurisdiction would, therefore, not be tested against the Supreme

286. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see also Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 440 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that only
in “rare cases” will an inconvenience to the defendant in litigating in the particular forum “defeat
the reasonableness of jurisdiction”).
287. 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997).
288. Id. at 946 (citations omitted).
289. See Lescs v. Martinsburg Police Dep’t, No. 02-5062, 2002 WL 1998177, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 29, 2002) (holding that, although a nationwide service of process statute existed, forcing the
non-resident defendant into the forum of the district court was unfair and unconstitutional).
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Court’s minimum contacts analysis of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Determining whether minimum contacts will even exist in the migrant
worker context can prove to be unpredictable. Furthermore, under the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is clear that not obtaining minimum contacts
over farm owners will force migrant workers to travel to a distant location that
does have such contacts. Given the social conditions of migrants, this will not
happen. Although a nationwide service of process amendment to the AWPA
may seem like a small procedural device, it is essential to allow migrant
workers effective access to the courtroom.
It is unlikely that migrant workers will be financially capable of litigating a
suit hundreds, or even thousands, of miles from their home, given their highly
impoverished status and the federal restrictions on LSC attorneys from
partaking in class action suits. Moreover, migrant workers will not be willing
to sue their employer during the course of their employment. With the meager
income and unstable availability of work, migrant workers will fear that suing
the farm owner while employed only will result in the quick termination of
employment.290 When a migrant worker is forced to choose between suing his
employer or remaining in the fields so that he can feed his hungry family, the
options quickly fade from two choices to just one. Unless migrant workers
have access to the courts near the security of their personal homes, it is
unlikely that they will invoke their private right of action for violations
stemming under the AWPA.
Qualifying the nationwide service of process amendment to allow for a
rebuttable presumption of a constitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction
will assure non-resident farm owners that they will not be unreasonably forced
to litigate in distant forums. Unfortunately, the unpredictability of determining
personal jurisdiction will still hang over migrant workers’ heads because
personal jurisdiction under the AWPA will not be per se constitutional. The
unpredictability, however, in determining the existence of personal jurisdiction
will be the exception instead of the rule. The weight of the Burger King
factors291 will typically balance in favor of constitutionally asserting personal
jurisdiction because of the extremely poor conditions migrant workers are
positioned in, as Justice Levine pointed out in Rios. A fair balance between
farm owner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights can be
harmonized through this service of process amendment. Moreover, such a
combination fits well within the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the personal

290. ROTHENBERG, supra note 1, at 275 (interviewing Jose Martinez, a migrant worker from
Lawrence, Michigan: “A lot of [employers] view migrants as disposable labor. When they want
workers, they bring them up, and when they don’t want them anymore, they send them back
to . . . wherever they’re from.”).
291. See supra note 17.
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jurisdiction doctrine as being that of an “evolving” standard.292 In this respect,
the AWPA amendment is a subset of the evolving nature of the Court’s view
of personal jurisdiction. By allowing migrant workers the procedural tool of
nationwide service of process, migrant workers will be given a chance to assert
their rights under federal law, and therefore be given at least the opportunity to
enter through the courtroom doors.
SUNIL BHAVE*

292. See supra note 85.
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